Appendix

Expanding or defending legitimacy? Why international organizations intensify self-legitimation

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This appendix presents the sample of IOs, details the operationalization of variables, and shows alternative models that we do not offer in full in the paper.

Table of Contents

A1 Sample of international organizations

Acronym	Name	Inception (years in the sample)
Africa		
AU/OAU	Organization of African Unity/African Union	1963 (40)
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Union	1994 (26)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	1994 (26)
EAC	East African Community	1996 (24)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	1975 (40)
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	1986 (34)
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	2002 (18)
SADC	Southern African Development Community	1980 (40)
Asia-Pacific		
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	1967 (40)
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	1981 (39)
PIF	Pacific Island Forum	1973 (40)
SAARC	South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation	1985 (35)
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2001 (19)
Americas		
CAN	Andean Pact/Andean Community	1969 (40)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	1968 (40)
Mercosur	Common Market of the South	1991 (40)
OAS	Organization of American States	1951 (40)
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	1982 (38)
SICA	Central American Integration System	1952 (40)
Europe		
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	1960 (40)
EU	European Union	1952 (40)
NordC	Nordic Council	1952 (40)
COE	Council of Europe	1949 (40)
Cross-Regional		
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	1991 (29)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	1991 (29)
LoAS	League of Arab States	1945 (40)
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	1968 (40)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	1992 (28)

A2 Operationalization of variables

A2.1 Dependent variable (self-legitimation intensity)

We measure self-legitimation intensity with the help of data generated in a large data-gathering effort within the research project LegRO (Schmidtke et al. 2023). As detailed in the codebook, we tested data reliability for the identification of legitimation statements and the coding of all variables.[1] Reliability tests build on a random sample of approximately five percent of the corpus. For all steps of the coding process, we achieved a Krippendorff's α of 0.669 or higher.

Coded documents and coding unit

We analyze IO annual reports and communiqués of meetings of heads of state and government. For each document, we apply a sampling procedure by which we select a specific number of paragraphs – our coding unit – for coding. We focus on those sections in the respective documents that are particularly interesting from a legitimation perspective because they are rich in expressions of commitments to basic principles, key elements of the organization's philosophy, the organization's conception of itself, and its desired public image. The sections are easily identified as general overviews, summaries, forewords, introductions, and conclusions. They are typically found at the beginning and end of documents. Since the number of paragraphs in the selected sections varies across organizations, we calculate a 25 percent range around the mean number of paragraphs in these sections. As a result, we code a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 28 paragraphs per document. Given that we use two types of documents per IO year, the self-legitimation of an IO each year is represented by a minimum of 32 and a maximum of 56 paragraphs.[2]

Identifying a legitimation statement

In the first step of the coding process, we decided whether a paragraph makes a legitimation statement based on a stylized legitimation grammar. This grammar takes two different forms. The first one (OES) assumes that legitimation requires a normative assessment of an IO, which contains one necessary and one sufficient component. The necessary component is a positive evaluation (E) of the IO, its core bodies, the entirety of

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[1] For more information on the project and the codebook, see (Lenz et al. 2022).

[2] For some IO years, we were not able to obtain both types of documents. For these years, an IO year is generally represented by a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 28 paragraphs. In some cases, entire documents are shorter than the minimum.

member states, or a core work program (O). The sufficient component is a normative standard (S) explaining why the IO is legitimate. This leads to the following grammar:

> The [object of legitimation (O)] is legitimate [normative evaluation (E)] because [normative standard (S)].

The second grammar (OIS) follows the idea that legitimation can also express identity as a commitment to the normative standard.

> The [object of legitimation (O) = RO as a whole] is committed [expression of identity (I)] to [normative standard (S)].

Identifying standards of legitimation

In the next step, we identify the normative standards highlighted in self-legitimation statements. We operate with a typology that distinguishes legitimation standards along two core dimensions: *normative* and *institutional* (for a similar approach, see Binder and Heupel 2021; Dellmuth et al. 2019; Dingwerth et al. 2019; Schneider et al. 2010; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). We differentiate technocratic, liberal, and communitarian norms within the normative dimension. The institutional dimension includes procedures, performance, and purpose. The resulting typology constitutes the basic portfolio of normative standards from which IOs draw to justify their authority. As the table below shows, we further distinguish specific normative standards within these nine cells. For example, we differentiate between economic welfare, peace and security, international influence, and functional capability within the category of functional-performance self-legitimation. Apart from the standards that fall into this typology, we code two standards that do not highlight a specific institutional dimension: "external recognition" and "structural necessity." Finally, we have a residual category for legitimation standards that do not specify the standard that underpins legitimation statements or that cannot be allocated to one of the cells of the typology ("other")

The generalized justification of an IO's authority must highlight a unique normative standard to qualify as a distinct legitimation statement. Consequently, we counted one legitimation statement per highlighted standard but no additional statement(s) if a standard appears multiple times.

Standards of legitimation

	Procedure	Performance	Purpose
Technocracy	• Functional capability	• Economic welfare • Peace and security • International influence • Functional capability	• Economic welfare • Peace and security • International influence • Functional capability
Liberalism	• Democracy (within the IO) • Rule of law (within the IO)	• Democracy (within and between states) • Rule of law (within and between states) • Human rights • Environmental protection	• Democracy (within and between states) • Rule of law (within and between states) • Human rights • Environmental protection
Communitarianism	• National sovereignty • Community/ identity	• National sovereignty • Political community • Economic community	• National sovereignty • Political community • Economic community
Other	Structural necessity, External recognition, Other		

<u>Construction of dependent variable</u>

Building on this coding effort, we construct the dependent variable – self-legitimation intensity – by dividing the number of identified legitimation statements by the number of coded paragraphs. Finally, since the annual scores of self-legitimation intensity are relatively sensitive to individual coder decisions and the drafting process of the analyzed documents, we use a two-year rolling mean in the estimations.

Distribution of dependent variable

A2.2 Independent variables

Pooling. We use an updated version of the Measure of International Authority (MIA) dataset provided by Hooghe et al. (2017) and updated for 2011 to 2019 by Haftel and Lenz (2022). This dataset provides an aggregate pooling index that captures the extent to which member state bodies move from the unanimity principle towards various forms of majority voting across six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, policymaking, budgetary allocation, and non-compliance, as well as constitutional reform. The variable is an aggregate index that ranges from zero to one (from low to high), with an empirical maximum of 0.56, reached by the AU since its 2003 reform.

Delegation. We use the same dataset to measure delegation as the extent to which member states empower agents to set the agenda and make the final decision across the same six decision areas. This aggregate index ranges from zero to one (from low to high), with an empirical maximum of 0.65 reached by the European Union with the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

Policy scope. This variable counts the number of policy areas from a list of 25 for which an IO is formally responsible each year. To count as an IO policy, the issue is administered by the IO rather than constituting an aggregation of bilateral member state policies, and it is institutionalized in that it leaves a tangible legal, financial, or organizational footprint evidenced in documentation such as treaties, protocols, declarations, etc. (Hooghe et al. 2019).[3]

Membership scope. We operationalize the number of IO members with the help of the Correlates of War (COW) International Organizations dataset, which provides annual membership information for the IOs in our sample (Pevehouse et al. 2020). For 2015-2019, we added missing membership information by counting the number of members listed on IO websites.

Protest. We operationalize protest against IOs with the help of data generated by keyword searches for the IO name or acronym and the terms "protestor" or "demonstrator" in the Major World Newspapers corpus of the online newspaper database LexisNexis, which includes more than 400 English-language newspapers from all world regions (Tallberg et al. 2013; Dingwerth et al. 2020). We use the logarithmized count of hits per IO year to limit the effect of outliers.

Media salience (robustness). We operationalize the media salience of IOs with the help of data generated by keyword searches for the IO name or acronym in the Major World Newspapers corpus of the online newspaper database LexisNexis (Tallberg et al. 2013; Dingwerth et al. 2020). We use the logarithmized count of hits per IO year to limit the effect of outliers.

A2.3 Controls

Cold War. We distinguish the pre-and post-Cold War phase by separating our data before and after 1989.

Economic crises. Using an approach developed to gauge the effects of economic hardship on international cooperation (Davis and Pelc 2017; Haftel et al. 2020), we construct a measure that captures the severity of economic difficulties in IO member states. To this end, we first utilize data from Laeven and Valencia (2018) to code whether an IO member state was in a banking, currency, or sovereign debt crisis in a given year. Second, we sum the resulting scores for the entire IO membership. Finally, assuming that a crisis is a situation that threatens significant harm to a group of actors and compels a response under time pressure and uncertainty (Lipscy 2020, p. E99), we code an IO year as an economic crisis year if the resulting count of member states in an economic crisis is in the 95th percentile for a given IO and decade.

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[3] The data are available at: https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/international-authority

Security crises. We apply a similar logic concerning *security crises*. Using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID5) dataset compiled by the Correlates of War project (Palmer et al. 2022), this measure uses the count of interstate wars in which IO member states were involved and codes a security crisis when the number of member states in interstate ware is in 95th percentile of a given IO and decade.

Type of documents. This is an indicator variable, showing whether our coding builds exclusively on annual reports, exclusively on communiqués of heads of state and government, or on both types of documents.

A3 Correlation matrix

A4 Robustness checks

Table A4 Regression analysis of self-legitimation intensity (the original model in the paper)

	Self-legitimation intensity (2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag)	Reactive (3-year lag and controls)	Proactive (no lag)	Proactive (no lag and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	0.766***	0.615***	0.607***	0.531***
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Delegation	0.062	0.070	0.039	0.032
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.104)
Policy scope	-0.006	-0.008	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Membership scope	0.006*	0.005	0.005*	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Protest	0.004	-0.009		
	(0.022)	(0.022)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.151*	-0.147*		
	(0.060)	(0.059)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.036	-0.043		
	(0.055)	(0.054)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.002	0.003		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.0004	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.089***		0.036
		(0.020)		(0.020)
Economic crises		-0.039		-0.035
		(0.025)		(0.024)
Security crises		-0.007		-0.003
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Communiqué missing	0.034	0.030	0.046	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Annual report missing	-0.081***	-0.073**	-0.061**	-0.061**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	820	856	851
R^2	0.088	0.113	0.096	0.101
Adjusted R^2	0.044	0.067	0.059	0.061

Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.1 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (multi-level model)

	Self-legitimation intensity (2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag) (M1)	Reactive (3-year lag and controls) (M2)	Proactive (no lag) (M3)	Proactive (no lag and controls) (M4)
Pooling	0.481**	0.346*	0.390**	0.300*
	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.129)	(0.131)
Delegation	0.016	0.030	-0.003	-0.010
	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.096)
Policy scope	-0.0002	-0.002	0.006*	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Membership scope	0.003	0.003	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Protest	0.017	0.003		
	(0.021)	(0.021)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.153**	-0.146*		
	(0.058)	(0.057)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.034	-0.043		
	(0.051)	(0.050)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.002	0.002		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.001	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.092***		0.046*
		(0.019)		(0.020)
Economic crises		-0.041		-0.035
		(0.025)		(0.024)
Security crises		-0.007		-0.002
		(0.024)		(0.023)
Communiqué missing	0.030	0.027	0.039	0.035
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Annual report missing	-0.087***	-0.080***	-0.070**	-0.070**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	0.269***	0.252***	0.210***	0.215***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Observations	823	820	856	851
AIC	-407.098	-423.842	-430.507	-428.150
BIC	-341.116	-343.783	-387.737	-371.193

Multi-level model using the lme4 R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4.2 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (no rolling mean)

	Self-legitimation intensity			
	Reactive (3-year lag)	Reactive (3-year lag and controls)	Proactive (no lag)	Proactive (no lag and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	0.632**	0.484*	0.600***	0.530**
	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.174)	(0.180)
Delegation	0.123	0.132	0.079	0.055
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.121)
Policy scope	-0.004	-0.007	0.001	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Membership scope	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Protest	-0.017	-0.031		
	(0.026)	(0.026)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.150*	-0.145*		
	(0.071)	(0.071)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.061	-0.069		
	(0.066)	(0.065)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.004	0.004*		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.001	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.086***		0.028
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Economic crises		-0.069*		-0.053
		(0.030)		(0.029)
Security crises		-0.013		-0.008
		(0.029)		(0.028)
Communiqué missing	0.039	0.035	0.048	0.042
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Annual report missing	-0.097***	-0.088**	-0.078**	-0.076**
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	860	898	891
R^2	0.062	0.080	0.071	0.073
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.034	0.035	0.034

Multi-level model using the lme4 R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4.3 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (3-year rolling mean)

	Self-legitimation intensity (3-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag) (M1)	Reactive (3-year lag and controls) (M2)	Proactive (no lag) (M3)	Proactive (no lag and controls) (M4)
Pooling	0.758***	0.622***	0.671***	0.628***
	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.135)	(0.138)
Delegation	0.033	0.042	0.065	0.061
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.098)
Policy scope	-0.004	-0.006	0.002	0.0005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Membership scope	0.007**	0.006*	0.005*	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Protest	0.007	-0.006		
	(0.020)	(0.020)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.140**	-0.133*		
	(0.054)	(0.054)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.046	-0.053		
	(0.049)	(0.048)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.002	0.003		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.0003	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.077***		0.026
		(0.018)		(0.019)
Economic crises		-0.028		-0.035
		(0.022)		(0.022)
Security crises		-0.005		0.0002
		(0.022)		(0.022)
Communiqué missing	0.019	0.020	0.035	0.034
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Annual report missing	-0.095***	-0.086***	-0.068**	-0.067**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	804	803	822	821
R^2	0.125	0.144	0.127	0.129
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.098	0.090	0.089

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4.4 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity ((log) intensity, 2-year rolling mean)

	Self-legitimation intensity (log 2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag)	Reactive (3-year lag and controls)	Proactive (no lag)	Proactive (no lag and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	1.921***	1.590***	1.570***	1.391***
	(0.367)	(0.366)	(0.293)	(0.301)
Delegation	0.236	0.209	0.203	0.148
	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.204)	(0.207)
Policy scope	-0.012	-0.014	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Membership scope	0.009	0.006	0.008	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Protest	-0.001	-0.027		
	(0.044)	(0.044)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.282*	-0.272*		
	(0.121)	(0.119)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.017	-0.027		
	(0.110)	(0.108)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.003	0.003		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.001	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.189***		0.086*
		(0.040)		(0.041)
Economic crises		-0.094		-0.080
		(0.050)		(0.048)
Security crises		-0.040		-0.033
		(0.048)		(0.047)
Communiqué missing	0.018	0.006	0.047	0.033
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Annual report missing	-0.213***	-0.196***	-0.162***	-0.162***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	820	856	851
R^2	0.111	0.140	0.116	0.123
Adjusted R^2	0.068	0.095	0.080	0.084

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4.5 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (1-year lead for proactive models)

	Self-legitimation intensity (2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag)	Reactive (3-year lag and controls)	Proactive (1-year lead)	Proactive (1-year lead and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	0.766***	0.615***	0.716***	0.645***
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.147)	(0.152)
Delegation	0.062	0.070	0.053	0.053
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.107)
Policy scope	-0.006	-0.008	0.002	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Membership scope	0.006*	0.005	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Protest	0.004	-0.009		
	(0.022)	(0.022)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.151*	-0.147*		
	(0.060)	(0.059)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.036	-0.043		
	(0.055)	(0.054)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.002	0.003		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.0004	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.089***		0.018
		(0.020)		(0.021)
Economic crises		-0.039		-0.034
		(0.025)		(0.024)
Security crises		-0.007		-0.002
		(0.024)		(0.023)
Communiqué missing	0.034	0.030	0.050*	0.045
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Annual report missing	-0.081***	-0.073**	-0.056*	-0.056*
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	820	860	853
R^2	0.088	0.113	0.103	0.109
Adjusted R^2	0.044	0.067	0.067	0.069

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table A4.6 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (2-year lag for reactive models)

	Self-legitimation intensity (2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (2-year lag)	Reactive (2-year lag and controls)	Proactive (no lag)	Proactive (no lag and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	0.708***	0.579**	0.607***	0.531***
	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Delegation	0.064	0.068	0.039	0.032
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.104)
Policy scope	-0.003	-0.005	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Membership scope	0.007*	0.006	0.005*	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Protest	-0.013	-0.024		
	(0.021)	(0.021)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.146*	-0.147*		
	(0.059)	(0.059)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.077	-0.081		
	(0.054)	(0.053)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.004*	0.004*		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.001	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.072***		0.036
		(0.020)		(0.020)
Economic crises		-0.027		-0.035
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Security crises		-0.006		-0.003
		(0.023)		(0.024)
Communiqué missing	0.038	0.032	0.046	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Annual report missing	-0.072**	-0.068**	-0.061**	-0.061**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	842	839	856	851
R²	0.097	0.114	0.096	0.101
Adjusted R²	0.054	0.068	0.059	0.061

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4.7 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (3-year lag for authority and 2-year lag for protest in reactive models)

	Self-legitimation intensity (2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag for authority, 2-year lag for protest)	Reactive ((3-year lag for authority, 2-year lag for protest, and controls)	Proactive (no lag)	Proactive (no lag and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	0.796***	0.661***	0.607***	0.531***
	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Delegation	0.062	0.065	0.039	0.032
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.104)
Policy scope	-0.007	-0.008*	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Membership scope	0.006*	0.005	0.005*	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Protest	-0.007	-0.020		
	(0.021)	(0.021)		
Pooling*Protest	-0.151*	-0.153*		
	(0.061)	(0.060)		
Delegation*Protest	-0.039	-0.043		
	(0.055)	(0.054)		
Policy scope*Protest	0.003	0.003*		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope*Protest	0.0004	0.001		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.083***		0.036
		(0.020)		(0.020)
Economic crises		-0.032		-0.035
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Security crises		-0.004		-0.003
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Communiqué missing	0.037	0.033	0.046	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Annual report missing	-0.081***	-0.073**	-0.061**	-0.061**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	835	832	856	851
R²	0.093	0.115	0.096	0.101
Adjusted R²	0.050	0.069	0.059	0.061

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A4.8 Change in IO self-legitimation intensity (salience instead of protest)

	Self-legitimation intensity (2-year rolling mean)			
	Reactive (3-year lag)	Reactive ((3-year lag and controls)	Proactive (no lag)	Proactive (no lag and controls)
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Pooling	0.690***	0.545**	0.607***	0.531***
	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.147)	(0.151)
Delegation	-0.005	0.011	0.039	0.032
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.104)
Policy scope	-0.004	-0.006	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Membership scope	0.004	0.003	0.005*	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Salience	0.022	-0.002		
	(0.024)	(0.025)		
Pooling*Salience	-0.037	-0.037		
	(0.058)	(0.058)		
Delegation* Salience	0.111*	0.090		
	(0.055)	(0.055)		
Policy scope* Salience	-0.001	-0.0002		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Membership scope* Salience	-0.001	-0.0003		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Post-Cold War		0.086***		0.036
		(0.021)		(0.020)
Economic crises		-0.041		-0.035
		(0.025)		(0.024)
Security crises		-0.004		-0.003
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Communiqué missing	0.037	0.033	0.046	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Annual report missing	-0.089***	-0.080***	-0.061**	-0.061**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
IO fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	820	856	851
R²	0.089	0.111	0.096	0.101
Adjusted R²	0.045	0.065	0.059	0.061

OLS fixed effects model using the plm R package, Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

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