

**Codebook MIA-Master**  
**Measure of International Authority (MIA v. 2)**  
version May 31, 2021

***Citation for the dataset***

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017.** *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance.* Oxford: OUP, 888pp.

The Measure of International Authority (MIA) contains estimates of the delegation and pooling of authority (1950-2019) and policy portfolio for 76 international organizations (1950-2017). We are currently extending the measures through 2020.

**This is the codebook for MIA-Master that accompanies the Master\_May 2021.dta dataset and the do-file combined DelPool\_May 2021.do.**

Data available on: <https://www.tobiaslenz.com/dataset-MIA>

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## Table 1: MIA datasets

<b>MIA-Authority</b>	Annual scores on delegation and pooling for each international governmental organization from 1950-2018. Each row breaks an IO-year down into delegation, pooling, and their components.
MIA-Master data	Annual scores for each scoring indicator, which presents the data at the most disaggregated level. The unit of analysis is IO-year-body-decision area-decision stage. Please use this dataset if you would like to compose your own authority indicators.
MIA IO excel	IO-specific excel that reports a matrix where the unit of observation is the IO body at a decision stage in a decision area in a year of reform. This is the most complete record of our coding for a particular IO. These IO excel files contain some scoring that is not reflected in the MIA-Master data.
MIA IO profile	The narrative of each IO contains a brief history of the IO as well as the justification (and sourcing) of each coding decision that is recorded in MIA IO excel.
MIA-Policy	Annual scores for each international governmental organization from 1950-2017. Each row breaks an IO-year down by 25 policy areas, policy scope, core policy, and flanking policy.

A codebook accompanies each dataset. **This is the codebook for MIA-Master.**

## Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is the individual international governmental organization (henceforth international organization or IO) which we define as a formal organization for collective decision making among at least three member states. An IO is international in that it is constituted among national governments. It is an organization in that it is structured by rules for a continuous purpose.

How many IOs do we identify? We code 76 international organizations over the course of 1950-2019, varying over the years between 31 and 80.

What do we measure? International authority, that is political authority in the international domain. Political authority is the power to make collective decisions based on a recognized obligation to obey. We conceptualize international authority as delegation, the conditional grant of authority by member states to an independent body, and pooling, the joint exercise of authority by member states.

Which years do we code? The dataset covers the period 1950 (or the founding year of an IO, if later) to 2019 (or the final year of IO existence, if earlier). We code an institutional reform from the year that it comes into effect.

How do we keep track of change? We synthesize all observations used in scoring in an excel file for each IO. We begin with the structure and decision rules in 1950 or the first year of an IO's existence. For each year in which we detect change, we start a new row in the excel file. This manual explains how we detect and code the most disaggregated elements of an IO's authority, which we then employ to aggregate up to estimate IO delegation and IO pooling.

How do we justify a coding decision? Our judgments relate to rules laid down in treaties, conventions, protocols, rules of procedures, statutes, or other documents. We reference the documentary basis, and we seek to triangulate our judgements with secondary sources. Profiles for each IO detail documentary bases, secondary sources, and explain our observations. These profiles are available on the website.

## Coding structure and composition of IO bodies

Delegation and pooling describe which actors make decisions, the rules under which they make decisions, and the kinds of decisions they make. This section explains how we how disaggregate IO decision making so we can later put the pieces back together to estimate delegation and pooling.


We use a general model of decision making that can apply to any IO and so allow systematic comparison, cross-sectionally and over time. The model cuts three ways: by IO body; by decision stage; and by decision area.

- **IO body.** We distinguish six kinds of IO body. Besides member states, an IO consists of one or more assemblies, executives, secretariats, consultative bodies, and dispute settlement mechanisms.

- **Decision stage.** We distinguish five stages of decision making: agenda setting, final decision making, opt-out, ratification, and dispute settlement.
- **Decision area.** We distinguish six decision areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and up to five streams of policy making.

The coding taps the structure and composition of IO bodies and their role in decision making. We examine 1) the role and composition of institutional actors in an IO; 2) at distinct stages of decision making; 3) across particular decision areas. These components are represented in Figure 1 below, which is guided by the following question: What role does each IO body—having a particular mode of state or non-state composition, appointment, and representation—play at each stage of decision making in each decision area? This produces a matrix where the unit of observation is the *IO body at a decision stage in a decision area in a year*.

Figure 1: A model of decision making



Source: Hooghe et al. (2017: p. 24).

At the left of the figure the member states and their representatives compose the assembly, executive, and other IO bodies. The dashed arrows represent the simplest set-up. Most IOs have more than one assembly (we code up to three), executive (we code up to five), or general secretariat (up to two). In many IOs, the assembly has an independent role in the composition of the executive and general secretariat, and the dashed arrow connections among the bodies can be diverse. Indicators for each IO body assess its composition, member state representation, appointment, and removal procedures.

The solid arrows in the figure traverse five stages of decision making in a single area, member accession. The full model treats all six decision areas. For agenda setting and the final decision we code the relevant voting rule for each IO body at each stage in each decision area. The subsequent decision stage taps the depth of member state obligation, i.e how binding a decision is, and to what extent it is subject to ratification. Finally, we assess legal dispute settlement as a distinct stage of decision making.

These are the building blocks—Lego blocks—that can be used to produce more aggregate estimates of the exercise of authority in or by an IO.<sup>1</sup> The dataset MIA-Authority represents our own operationalization of how to aggregate these components up to delegation and pooling (for a fuller explanation, see the codebook on MIA-Authority and Chapters Two and Three in Hooghe et al. (2017)). However, this Lego block approach makes it possible for users to make their own decisions regarding the variables that they wish to encompass to suit their purpose.

For each IO-year, we first decompose the institutional structure of the IO – identify the IO bodies, and examine their composition, and in particular the extent to which their composition and functioning is controlled by member states individually or collectively. Next, we examine the decision making process in six decision areas across five decision stages. Here we look at the respective role of each IO body and its voting rules, and the extent to which IO decisions are binding, are subject to ratification, and subject to dispute settlement.

## Sources

For conceptualizing international authority and its operationalization, please see:

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017**. *Measuring International Authority*. Chapter One: Measuring International Authority. OUP: 34-106.

For a detailed discussion of the coding schema and its application, please consult:

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017**. *Measuring International Authority*. [Chapter Two: How We Apply the Coding Scheme](#). OUP: 34-106.

For a step-by-step guide on how to aggregate scores for delegation and pooling into MIA, please see:

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017**. *Measuring International Authority*. [Chapter Three: From Scoring to Aggregation—The MIA Dataset](#). OUP: 107-132.

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<sup>1</sup> For an explanation of how we propose to aggregate these components up to delegation and pooling, see the codebook on MIA-Authority and read Chapters Two and Three in Hooghe et al. (2017).

## Table 2: Entries in stata file

variable name	variable label
ioname	ioname
acronym	acronym
fullname	fullname
ionumber	Ionumber (COW)
year	Year
inception	Creation of IO
initial	Initial (first year in dataset)
end	End (final year in dataset)
type1	type1 = 1: general purpose    0: task-specific
contract	Contract = 1: highly incomplete    0: relatively complete
A1_1	A1_1: how are members selected?
A1_2	A1_2: Do members directly represent MS?
A1_3a	A1_3a: Is voting weighted?
A2_1	A2_1
A2_2	A2_2
A2_3a	A2_3a
A3_1	A3_1
A3_2	A3_2
A3_3a	A3_3a
E1_6	E1_6: How are members selected?
E1_7	E1_7: Do MS have full or partial representation?
E1_8	E1_8: Do members of the executive directly represent MS?
E1_9a	E1_9a: Is a subset of seats reserved?
E1_9b	E1_9b: Is voting weighted?
E1_9c	E1_9c: Does weighted voting provide some MS with veto?
E2_6	E2_6
E2_7	E2_7
E2_8	E2_8
E2_9a	E2_9a
E2_9b	E2_9b
E2_9c	E2_9c
E3_6	E3_6
E3_7	E3_7
E3_8	E3_8
E3_9a	E3_9a
E3_9b	E3_9b
E3_9c	E3_9c
year2	year2
GS1_10	GS1_10: What decision rule selects the GS?

GS1_10_rotation	GS1_10_rotation: is GS by MS rotation?
GS1_10_nonstate	GS1_10_nonstate: is GS selected by nonstate?
GS2_10	GS2_10
GS2_10_rotation	GS2_10_rotation
GS2_10_nonstate	GS2_10_nonstate
CB_14	CB_14: Is there a standing channel for non-state reps?
CB1_15	CB1_15: What is its composition?
CB2_15	CB2_15
CB3_15	CB3_15
ACC16a_norule	ACC16a_norule: are there formal rules on accession?
ACC16a_technocratic	ACC16a_technocratic: is accession decided technocratically?
ACC16a_A1	ACC16a_A1: Is Assembly 1 involved, and what is the decision rule?
ACC16a_A2	ACC16a_A2
ACC16a_A3	ACC16a_A3
ACC16a_E1	ACC16a_E1
ACC16a_E2	ACC16a_E2
ACC16a_E3	ACC16a_E3
ACC16a_GS1	ACC16a_GS1
ACC16a_GS2	ACC16a_GS2
ACC16a_MS	ACC16a_MS
ACC16a_CB1	ACC16a_CB1
ACC16a_CB2	ACC16a_CB2
ACC16a_CB3	ACC16a_CB3
ACC16a_rotate	ACC16a_rotate
ACC16b_norule	ACC16b_norule
ACC16b_technocratic+A105	ACC16b_technocratic
ACC16b_A1	ACC16b_A1: Is Assembly 1 involved, and what is the decision rule?
ACC16b_A2	ACC16b_A2
ACC16b_A3	ACC16b_A3
ACC16b_E1	ACC16b_E1
ACC16b_E2	ACC16b_E2
ACC16b_E3	ACC16b_E3
ACC16b_GS1	ACC16b_GS1
ACC16b_GS2	ACC16b_GS2
ACC16b_MS	ACC16b_MS
ACC16b_CB1	ACC16b_CB1
ACC16b_CB2	ACC16b_CB2
ACC16b_CB3	ACC16b_CB3
ACC16b_rotate	ACC16b_rotate
ACC17	ACC17: is ratification on accession by existing MS required?
year3	year3
SUSP18a_norule	SUSP18a_norule
SUSP18a_technocratic	SUSP18a_technocratic

SUSP18a_A1	SUSP18a_A1
SUSP18a_A2	SUSP18a_A2
SUSP18a_A3	SUSP18a_A3
SUSP18a_E1	SUSP18a_E1
SUSP18a_E2	SUSP18a_E2
SUSP18a_E3	SUSP18a_E3
SUSP18a_GS1	SUSP18a_GS1
SUSP18a_GS2	SUSP18a_GS2
SUSP18a_MS	SUSP18a_MS
SUSP18a_CB1	SUSP18a_CB1
SUSP18a_CB2	SUSP18a_CB2
SUSP18a_CB3	SUSP18a_CB3
SUSP18a_DS	SUSP18a_DS
SUSP18a_rotate	SUSP18a_rotate
SUSP18b_norules	SUSP18b_norules
SUSP18b_technocratic	SUSP18b_technocratic
SUSP18b_A1	SUSP18b_A1
SUSP18b_A2	SUSP18b_A2
SUSP18b_A3	SUSP18b_A3
SUSP18b_E1	SUSP18b_E1
SUSP18b_E2	SUSP18b_E2
SUSP18b_E3	SUSP18b_E3
SUSP18b_GS1	SUSP18b_GS1
SUSP18b_GS2	SUSP18b_GS2
SUSP18b_MS	SUSP18b_MS
SUSP18b_CB1	SUSP18b_CB1
SUSP18b_CB2	SUSP18b_CB2
SUSP18b_CB3	SUSP18b_CB3
SUSP18b_rotate	SUSP18b_rotate
CON19a_norule	CON19a_norule
CON19a_techno~c	CON19a_technocratic
CON19a_A1	CON19a_A1
CON19a_A2	CON19a_A2
CON19a_A3	CON19a_A3
CON19a_E1	CON19a_E1
CON19a_E2	CON19a_E2
CON19a_E3	CON19a_E3
CON19a_GS1	CON19a_GS1
CON19a_GS2	CON19a_GS2
CON19a_MS	CON19a_MS
CON19a_CB1	CON19a_CB1
CON19a_CB2	CON19a_CB2
CON19a_CB3	CON19a_CB3
CON19a_nonstate	CON19a_nonstate



CON19a_rotate	CON19a_rotate
CON19b_norule	CON19b_norule
CON19b_technocratic	CON19b_technocratic
CON19b_A1	CON19b_A1
CON19b_A2	CON19b_A2
CON19b_A3	CON19b_A3
CON19b_E1	CON19b_E1
CON19b_E2	CON19b_E2
CON19b_E3	CON19b_E3
CON19b_GS1	CON19b_GS1
CON19b_GS2	CON19b_GS2
CON19b_MS	CON19b_MS
CON19b_CB1	CON19b_CB1
CON19b_CB2	CON19b_CB2
CON19b_CB3	CON19b_CB3
CON19b_rotate	CON19b_rotate
CON20	CON20: Is ratification of constitutional reform required?
REV21	REV21: Does the IO have independent revenue?
BUD22a_norule	BUD22a_norule
BUD22a_technocratic	BUD22a_technocratic
BUD22a_A1	BUD22a_A1
BUD22a_A2	BUD22a_A2
BUD22a_A3	BUD22a_A3
BUD22a_E1	BUD22a_E1
BUD22a_E2	BUD22a_E2
BUD22a_E3	BUD22a_E3
BUD22a_GS1	BUD22a_GS1
BUD22a_GS2	BUD22a_GS2
BUD22a_MS	BUD22a_MS
BUD22a_CB1	BUD22a_CB1
BUD22a_CB2	BUD22a_CB2
BUD22a_CB3	BUD22a_CB3
BUD22a_nonstate	BUD22a_nonstate
BUD22a_rotate	BUD22a_rotate
BUD22b_norule	BUD22b_norule
BUD22b_technocratic	BUD22b_technocratic
BUD22b_A1	BUD22b_A1
BUD22b_A2	BUD22b_A2
BUD22b_A3	BUD22b_A3
BUD22b_E1	BUD22b_E1
BUD22b_E2	BUD22b_E2
BUD22b_E3	BUD22b_E3
BUD22b_GS1	BUD22b_GS1
BUD22b_GS2	BUD22b_GS2

BUD22b_MS	BUD22b_MS
BUD22b_CB1	BUD22b_CB1
BUD22b_CB2	BUD22b_CB2
BUD22b_CB3	BUD22b_CB3
BUD22b_rotate	BUD22b_rotate
BUD23	BUD23: Is budgetary decision making binding?
COM24a_norule	COM24a_norule
COM24a_technocratic	COM24a_technocratic
COM24a_A1	COM24a_A1
COM24a_A2	COM24a_A2
COM24a_A3	COM24a_A3
COM24a_E1	COM24a_E1
COM24a_E2	COM24a_E2
COM24a_E3	COM24a_E3
COM24a_GS1	COM24a_GS1
COM24a_GS2	COM24a_GS2
COM24a_MS	COM24a_MS
COM24a_CB1	COM24a_CB1
COM24a_CB2	COM24a_CB2
COM24a_CB3	COM24a_CB3
COM24a_rotate	COM24a_rotate
COM24b_norule	COM24b_norule
COM24b_technocratic	COM24b_technocratic
COM24b_A1	COM24b_A1
COM24b_A2	COM24b_A2
COM24b_A3	COM24b_A3
COM24b_E1	COM24b_E1
COM24b_E2	COM24b_E2
COM24b_E3	COM24b_E3
COM24b_GS1	COM24b_GS1
COM24b_GS2	COM24b_GS2
COM24b_MS	COM24b_MS
COM24b_CB1	COM24b_CB1
COM24b_CB2	COM24b_CB2
COM24b_CB3	COM24b_CB3
COM24b_rotate	COM24b_rotate
PM1_25a_norule	PM1_25a_norule
PM1_25a_A1	PM1_25a_A1
PM1_25a_A2	PM1_25a_A2
PM1_25a_A3	PM1_25a_A3
PM1_25a_E1	PM1_25a_E1
PM1_25a_E2	PM1_25a_E2
PM1_25a_E3	PM1_25a_E3
PM1_25a_GS1	PM1_25a_GS1

PM1_25a_GS2	PM1_25a_GS2
PM1_25a_MS	PM1_25a_MS
PM1_25a_CB1	PM1_25a_CB1
PM1_25a_CB2	PM1_25a_CB2
PM1_25a_CB3	PM1_25a_CB3
PM1_25a_nonstate	PM1_25a_nonstate
PM1_25a_rotate	PM1_25a_rotate
PM1_25b_norule	PM1_25b_norule
PM1_25b_A1	PM1_25b_A1
PM1_25b_A2	PM1_25b_A2
PM1_25b_A3	PM1_25b_A3
PM1_25b_E1	PM1_25b_E1
PM1_25b_E2	PM1_25b_E2
PM1_25b_E3	PM1_25b_E3
PM1_25b_GS1	PM1_25b_GS1
PM1_25b_GS2	PM1_25b_GS2
PM1_25b_MS	PM1_25b_MS
PM1_25b_CB1	PM1_25b_CB1
PM1_25b_CB2	PM1_25b_CB2
PM1_25b_CB3	PM1_25b_CB3
PM1_25b_nonstate	PM1_25b_nonstate
PM1_25b_rotate	PM1_25b_rotate
PM1_25c	PM1_25c: What is GS role in initiating policy?
PM1_26	PM1_26: Are policy decisions binding?
PM1_27	PM1_27: Is ratification required?
year4	year4
PM2_25a_norule	PM2_25a_norule
PM2_25a_A1	PM2_25a_A1
PM2_25a_A2	PM2_25a_A2
PM2_25a_A3	PM2_25a_A3
PM2_25a_E1	PM2_25a_E1
PM2_25a_E2	PM2_25a_E2
PM2_25a_E3	PM2_25a_E3
PM2_25a_GS1	PM2_25a_GS1
PM2_25a_GS2	PM2_25a_GS2
PM2_25a_MS	PM2_25a_MS
PM2_25a_CB1	PM2_25a_CB1
PM2_25a_CB2	PM2_25a_CB2
PM2_25a_CB3	PM2_25a_CB3
PM2_25a_nonstate	PM2_25a_nonstate
PM2_25a_rotate	PM2_25a_rotate
PM2_25b_norule	PM2_25b_norule
PM2_25b_A1	PM2_25b_A1
PM2_25b_A2	PM2_25b_A2

PM2_25b_A3	PM2_25b_A3
PM2_25b_E1	PM2_25b_E1
PM2_25b_E2	PM2_25b_E2
PM2_25b_E3	PM2_25b_E3
PM2_25b_GS1	PM2_25b_GS1
PM2_25b_GS2	PM2_25b_GS2
PM2_25b_MS	PM2_25b_MS
PM2_25b_CB1	PM2_25b_CB1
PM2_25b_CB2	PM2_25b_CB2
PM2_25b_CB3	PM2_25b_CB3
PM2_25b_nonstate	PM2_25b_nonstate
PM2_25b_rotate	PM2_25b_rotate
PM2_25c	PM2_25c
PM2_26	PM2_26
PM2_27	PM2_27
PM3_25a_norule	PM3_25a_norule
PM3_25a_A1	PM3_25a_A1
PM3_25a_A2	PM3_25a_A2
PM3_25a_A3	PM3_25a_A3
PM3_25a_E1	PM3_25a_E1
PM3_25a_E2	PM3_25a_E2
PM3_25a_E3	PM3_25a_E3
PM3_25a_GS1	PM3_25a_GS1
PM3_25a_GS2	PM3_25a_GS2
PM3_25a_MS	PM3_25a_MS
PM3_25a_CB1	PM3_25a_CB1
PM3_25a_CB2	PM3_25a_CB2
PM3_25a_CB3	PM3_25a_CB3
PM3_25a_nonstate	PM3_25a_nonstate
PM3_25a_rotate	PM3_25a_rotate
PM3_25b_norule	PM3_25b_norule
PM3_25b_A1	PM3_25b_A1
PM3_25b_A2	PM3_25b_A2
PM3_25b_A3	PM3_25b_A3
PM3_25b_E1	PM3_25b_E1
PM3_25b_E2	PM3_25b_E2
PM3_25b_E3	PM3_25b_E3
PM3_25b_GS1	PM3_25b_GS1
PM3_25b_GS2	PM3_25b_GS2
PM3_25b_MS	PM3_25b_MS
PM3_25b_CB1	PM3_25b_CB1
PM3_25b_CB2	PM3_25b_CB2
PM3_25b_CB3	PM3_25b_CB3
PM3_25b_nonstate	PM3_25b_nonstate

PM3_25b_rotate	PM3_25b_rotate
PM3_25c	PM3_25c
PM3_26	PM3_26
PM3_27	PM3_27
PM4_25a_norule	PM4_25a_norule
PM4_25a_A1	PM4_25a_A1
PM4_25a_A2	PM4_25a_A2
PM4_25a_A3	PM4_25a_A3
PM4_25a_E1	PM4_25a_E1
PM4_25a_E2	PM4_25a_E2
PM4_25a_E3	PM4_25a_E3
PM4_25a_GS1	PM4_25a_GS1
PM4_25a_GS2	PM4_25a_GS2
PM4_25a_MS	PM4_25a_MS
PM4_25a_CB1	PM4_25a_CB1
PM4_25a_CB2	PM4_25a_CB2
PM4_25a_CB3	PM4_25a_CB3
PM4_25a_nonstate	PM4_25a_nonstate
PM4_25a_rotate	PM4_25a_rotate
PM4_25b_norule	PM4_25b_norule
PM4_25b_A1	PM4_25b_A1
PM4_25b_A2	PM4_25b_A2
PM4_25b_A3	PM4_25b_A3
PM4_25b_E1	PM4_25b_E1
PM4_25b_E2	PM4_25b_E2
PM4_25b_E3	PM4_25b_E3
PM4_25b_GS1	PM4_25b_GS1
PM4_25b_GS2	PM4_25b_GS2
PM4_25b_MS	PM4_25b_MS
PM4_25b_CB1	PM4_25b_CB1
PM4_25b_CB2	PM4_25b_CB2
PM4_25b_CB3	PM4_25b_CB3
PM4_25b_nonstate	PM4_25b_nonstate
PM4_25b_rotate	PM4_25b_rotate
PM4_25c	PM4_25c
PM4_26	PM4_26
PM4_27	PM4_27
PM5_25a_norule	PM5_25a_norule
PM5_25a_A1	PM5_25a_A1
PM5_25a_A2	PM5_25a_A2
PM5_25a_A3	PM5_25a_A3
PM5_25a_E1	PM5_25a_E1
PM5_25a_E2	PM5_25a_E2
PM5_25a_E3	PM5_25a_E3

PM5_25a_GS1	PM5_25a_GS1
PM5_25a_GS2	PM5_25a_GS2
PM5_25a_MS	PM5_25a_MS
PM5_25a_CB1	PM5_25a_CB1
PM5_25a_CB2	PM5_25a_CB2
PM5_25a_CB3	PM5_25a_CB3
PM5_25a_nonstate	PM5_25a_nonstate
PM5_25a_rotate	PM5_25a_rotate
PM5_25b_norule	PM5_25b_norule
PM5_25b_A1	PM5_25b_A1
PM5_25b_A2	PM5_25b_A2
PM5_25b_A3	PM5_25b_A3
PM5_25b_E1	PM5_25b_E1
PM5_25b_E2	PM5_25b_E2
PM5_25b_E3	PM5_25b_E3
PM5_25b_GS1	PM5_25b_GS1
PM5_25b_GS2	PM5_25b_GS2
PM5_25b_MS	PM5_25b_MS
PM5_25b_CB1	PM5_25b_CB1
PM5_25b_CB2	PM5_25b_CB2
PM5_25b_CB3	PM5_25b_CB3
PM5_25b_nonstate	PM5_25b_nonstate
PM5_25b_rotate	PM5_25b_rotate
PM5_25c	PM5_25c
PM5_26	PM5_26
PM5_27	PM5_27
GS8	GS: is GS authorized to carry out executive functions?
GS9	GS9: does the GS have an executive monopoly of initiative?
coverage1	coverage1: is DS obligatory?
thirdparty1	thirdparty1: is there an explicit right to third-party review?
tribunal1	tribunal1: how is the tribunal composed?
binding1	binding1: is adjudication binding?
nonstate1	nonstate1: do non-state actors have legal standing?
remedy1	remedy1: is there a remedy for non-compliance?
preliminary1	preliminary1: is there a preliminary ruling system?
coverage2	coverage2
thirdparty2	thirdparty2
tribunal2	tribunal2
binding2	binding2
nonstate2	nonstate2
remedy2	remedy2
preliminary2	preliminary2
coverage3	coverage3
thirdparty3	thirdparty3

tribunal3  
binding3  
nonstate3  
remedy3  
preliminary3

tribunal3  
binding3  
nonstate3  
remedy3  
preliminary3

### Table 3: Explanation of coding categories (stata file companion)

Green = in stata file || white = more info in individual IO excel files

Name of IO: ..... [fill out in header]

99: no documentation/ no written rules; 98: not applicable

#### A. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

NAME	BODY
	Assembly 1 (A1)
	Assembly 2 (A2)
	Assembly 3 (A3)
	Executive 1 (E1)
	Executive 2 (E2)
	Executive 3 (E3)
	Executive 4 (E4)
	Executive 5 (E5)
	General Secretariat (GS1)
	General Secretariat (GS2)
	Dispute settlement (DS1)
	Dispute settlement (DS2)
	Consultative body 1 (CB1)
	Consultative body 2 (CB2)
	Consultative body 3 (CB3)

[Note: Code each institution separately.]

An IO assembly is a) a plenary body consisting of all member states; b) with a rule making function as supreme legislative authority; that c) is usually responsible for the composition of one or more IO bodies. We code up to four assemblies

An IO executive is a) responsible for the execution of rules (laws); b) with a rule making function within guidelines set by the IO assembly. We code up to three executives.

An IO general secretariat is a) responsible for running the IO's headquarters, keeping records, and representing the IO to the outside world; and b) is also often charged with preparing and implementing decisions, conducting or commissioning background research, and monitoring member state compliance. We code up to two general secretariats.



An IO consultative body has a) some formal status as a recognized body or channel; b) possesses the right to be consulted on an ongoing basis; and c) is composed of non-state actors. We code up to three consultative bodies.

## 1) ASSEMBLY: A1 to A3

<p><b>A1_1. How are members of the assembly selected?</b></p> <p>0 All members of the assembly are selected by member states</p> <p>1 A majority, but not all, of the members of the assembly are selected by member states</p> <p>2 At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected by parliaments, subnational governments, or other non-member state actors</p> <p>3 At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected in popular election</p>
<p><b>A1_2. Do members of the assembly directly represent member states?</b></p> <p>0 All members of the assembly receive voting instructions by their government</p> <p>1 A majority, but not all, members of the assembly receive voting instructions by their government</p> <p>2 50 percent or less of the members of the assembly receive voting instructions by their government</p>
<p><b>A1_3.a. Is voting weighted?</b></p> <p>0 No</p> <p>1 Yes</p>
<p><b>3.b. If yes, what is the basis of weighted voting?</b></p> <p>If so, what is the basis: population, GDP, geography, financial contribution?</p>

## 2) EXECUTIVE: E1 to E5

### 4.a. Who proposes the head of the executive?

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus																
Supermajority																
Majority																
Voting not applicable																
No written rule																

#### 4.b. Who appoints the head of the executive?

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly			Executive					Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
		1	2	3	1	2	3	4	5							
Unanimity/ consensus																
Supermajority																
Majority																
Voting not applicable																
No written rule																

#### 5.a. Who proposes the members of the executive?

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly			Executive					Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
		1	2	3	1	2	3	4	5							
Unanimity/ consensus																
Supermajority																
Majority																
Voting not applicable																
No written rule																

5.b. Who appoints the members of the executive?

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus																
Supermajority																
Majority																
Voting not applicable																
No written rule																

**E1\_6. How are members of the executive selected?**

- 0 All members of the executive are selected by member states.
- 1 A majority, but not all, of the members of the executive are selected by member states.
- 2 At least 50 percent of the members of the executive selected by parliaments, subnational governments, or other non-member state actors.

**E1\_7. Do member states have full or partial representation?**

- 0 All member states are represented in the executive.
- 1 A subset of member states is represented in the executive.

**E1\_8. Do members of the executive directly represent member states?**

- 0 All representatives in the executive receive voting instructions by their government.
- 1 A majority, but not all members of the executive, receive voting instructions by their government.
- 2 50 percent or less of the members of the executive receive voting instructions by their government.

**9. Does representation in the executive deviate from one member, one vote?**

**E1\_9.a. Is a subset of seats reserved for particular members?**

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

If yes, what is the basis: financial contribution, economic interest, geopolitical weight, nuclear capability, host country?

**E1\_9.b. Is voting weighted?**

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

If yes, what is the basis: population, GDP, geography, financial contribution?

**E1\_9.c. Does weighted voting provide some member states with a veto?**

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

If yes, which countries can exercise a veto?

### 3) GENERAL SECRETARIAT: GS1 to GS2

#### GS1\_10. Who selects the head of the General Secretariat?

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

#### 11. Who can remove the head of the General Secretariat?

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**12. What is the length of tenure?**

Number of years or indeterminate: .....

**11. Is there an oath of independence or formal protection of IO bureaucracy impartiality and independence?**

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

**4) CONSULTATIVE BODIES: CB1 to CB3**

**CB\_14. Is there a standing channel or consultative body composed of non-state representatives?**

- 0 No channel/consultative body
- 1 One channel/consultative body
- 2 More than one channel/consultative body

**CB1\_15 [name]: .....**

- 1 Private representatives (e.g. business, trade unions, social movements, professional experts)
- 2 A combination of private representatives and public non-state representatives
- 3 Public non-state representatives selected by national or subnational assemblies
- 4 Public non-state representatives who are directly elected

**CB2\_15 [name]: .....**

- 1 Private representatives (e.g. business, trade unions, social movements, professional experts)
- 2 A combination of private representatives and public non-state representatives
- 3 Public non-state representatives selected by national or subnational assemblies
- 4 Public non-state representatives who are directly elected

**CB3\_15 [name]: .....**

- 1 Private representatives (e.g. business, trade unions, social movements, professional experts)
- 2 A combination of private representatives and public non-state representatives
- 3 Public non-state representatives selected by national or subnational assemblies
- 4 Public non-state representatives who are directly elected

## B. DECISION MAKING

### MEMBERSHIP: ACCESSION

#### ACC16.a. Who can initiate the accession of new members?

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (4)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

#### ACC16.b. Who makes the final decision on the accession of new members?

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (4)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**ACC17. Is ratification on accession by existing member states required?**

- 0 Every member state must ratify accession for it to come into effect.
- 1 Ratification by a subset of member states is required for accession to come into effect.
- 2 Ratification is not required for accession to come into effect.

**MEMBERSHIP: SUSPENSION**

**SUSP18.a. Who can initiate the suspension of a member state?**

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (4)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																



**SUSP18.b. Who makes the final decision on the suspension of a member state?**

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (4)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM**

**CON19.a. Who can initiate constitutional reform?**

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (4)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

### CON19.b. Who makes the final decision on constitutional reform?

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (4)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**CON20. Is ratification of constitutional reform required?**

0 Every member state must ratify the constitutional reform for it to come into effect.  
 1 The constitutional reform comes into effect only for those member states that ratify.  
 2 Ratification by a subset of member states is required for the constitutional reform to come into effect for all member states.  
 3 Ratification is not required for the constitutional reform to come into effect.

### FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING

**REV21. Does the IO have independent revenue?**

0 IO revenue consists of ad hoc or discretionary member state financing.  
 1 IO revenue consists of routinized, non-discretionary member state contributions (e.g. tied to GDP per capita)  
 2 IO revenue consists of routinized, non-discretionary member state contributions and the IO has own resources amounting to at least one quarter of its budget raised beyond the control of its member states (e.g. donations, grants, taxes, fees, bonds).

**BUD22a. Who drafts the budget?**

	Who decides?																
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly			Executive					Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule	
		Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5								
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																	
Selective veto (1)																	
Supermajority (2)																	
Majority (3)																	
Technocratic (4)																	
Voting not applicable (98)																	
No written rule (99)																	

**BUD22b. Who makes the final decision on the budget?**

	Who decides?																
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly			Executive					Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule	
		Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5								
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																	
Selective veto (1)																	
Supermajority (2)																	
Majority (3)																	
Technocratic (4)																	
Voting not applicable (98)																	
No written rule (99)																	

**BUD23. Is budgetary decision making binding?**

- 0 Budgetary decision making is not binding.
- 1 Budgetary decision making is binding unless a member state opts out of a program or financial commitment.
- 2 Budgetary decision making is binding.

**FINANCIAL COMPLIANCE**

**COM24a. Who can initiate proceedings on financial compliance?**

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (40)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**COM24b. Who makes the final decision on financial compliance?**

	Who decides?															
What is the decision rule?	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (40)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

## POLICY MAKING: POLICY 1 TO POLICY 5

- passing protocols or conventions;
- passing recommendations or declarations;
- passing laws, regulations, decisions, directives;
- designing, selecting, or running programs/ projects; funding programs/ projects;
- monitoring standards or practices

Please discuss briefly in the profile which levels of policy making there are and which of these seems most appropriate to code. If in doubt coding additional policy streams. ]

### PM1-5\_25a. Who can initiate policy?

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (40)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**PM1-5\_25b. Who makes the final decision on policy?**

	Who decides?															
	Member states	Assembly 1	Assembly 2	Assembly 3	Executive 1	Executive 2	Executive 3	Executive 4	Executive 5	Head of Executive	General Secretariat 1	General Secretariat 2	Other non-state actor*	Rotation	Automatic procedure	No written rule
<b>What is the decision rule?</b>																
Unanimity/ consensus (0)																
Selective veto (1)																
Supermajority (2)																
Majority (3)																
Technocratic (40)																
Voting not applicable (98)																
No written rule (99)																

**PM1-5\_25.c. What is the role of the general secretariat in initiating policy?**

- 0 The general secretariat has no formal role in initiating policy.
- 1 The general secretariat has a formal role in initiating policy, but does not monopolize agenda setting.
- 2 The general secretariat has a formal monopoly of initiative or is the only body with a formal role in agenda setting.

**PM1-5\_26. Are policy decisions binding?**

- 0 Policy decisions are not binding.
- 1 Policy decisions are binding unless a member state explicitly opts out.
- 2 Policy decisions are binding.

**PM1-5\_27. Is ratification of policy required?**

- 0 Every member state must ratify the policy for it to come into effect.
- 1 The policy comes into effect only for those member states that ratify.
- 2 Ratification by a subset of member states is required for the policy to come into effect for all member states.
- 3 Ratification is not required for the policy to come into effect.

## DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: DS1 to DS3

<b>28. Is the dispute settlement system obligatory? (coverage)</b>	
0	There is no dispute settlement.
1	The dispute settlement system is not obligatory; member states can opt out.
2	The dispute settlement system is obligatory; member states cannot opt out.
98	Not applicable
<b>29. Is there an explicit right to third-party review of disputes concerning member state compliance? (thirdparty)</b>	
0	There is no right to third-party review.
1	Access to third-party review is controlled by a political body.
2	There is an automatic right if third-party review.
<b>30. How is the tribunal composed? (tribunal)</b>	
0	There is no tribunal.
1	The tribunal is composed of ad hoc arbitrators.
2	The tribunal has a standing body of justices who rule collectively on all disputes during extended terms of service.
<b>31. Is adjudication binding? (binding)</b>	
0	Adjudication is not binding.
1	Adjudication is binding if there is ex ante agreement among disputing parties or if approved post hoc by a political body.
2	Adjudication is directly binding.
<b>32. Do non-state actors have legal standing? (nonstate)</b>	
0	Only member states can initiate dispute resolution.
1	The international secretariat (or other IO body) can initiate dispute resolution.
2	Non-state actors as well as state actors can initiate dispute resolution.
<b>33. Is there a remedy for non-compliance to the ruling? (remedy)</b>	
0	There is no remedy for non-compliance.
1	The remedy for non-compliance is retaliatory sanctions.
2	Court rulings have direct effect.
<b>34. Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals? (preliminary)</b>	
0	There is no preliminary ruling system.
1	There is a preliminary ruling system, but no national court is required to ask for a ruling.
2	There is a preliminary ruling system and some national courts are required to ask for a ruling.

Table 3: IO acronym, COW ID, year-rows in dataset

ALADI	3430	1961—2019
AMU	470	1989—2019
APEC	650	1991—2019
ASEAN	750	1967—2019
AU	3760	1963—2019
BIS	810	1950—2019
Benelux	840	1950—2019
CABI	871	1987—2019
CAN	330	1969—2019
CCNR	1050	1950—2019
CEMAC	1260	1966—2019
CERN	1720	1954—2019
CIS	1230	1992—2019
COE	1390	1950—2019
COMECON	1370	1959—1991
COMESA	1170	1982—2019
Caricom	880	1968—2019
ComSec	1240	1965—2019
EAC1	1750	1967—1976
EAC2	1751	1993—2019
ECCAS	1500	1985—2019
ECOWAS	1520	1975—2019
EEA	1831	1994—2019
EFTA	1670	1960—2019
ESA	1790	1980—2019
EU	1830	1952—2019
FAO	1840	1950—2019
GCC	1990	1981—2019
GEF	1900	1994—2019
IAEA	2370	1957—2019
IBRD	2400	1950—2019
ICAO	2500	1950—2019
ICC	2702	2002—2019
IGAD	2230	1986—2019
ILO	2830	1950—2019
IMF	2880	1950—2019
IMO	2860	1960—2019
IOM	2250	1955—2019
ISA	3100	1994—2019
ITU	3160	1950—2019
IWhale	3250	1950—2019
Interpol	2700	1950—2019
LOAS	3450	1950—2019
Mercosur	4260	1991—2019
NAFO	2572	1979—2019



NAFTA	3670	1994—2019
NATO	3700	1950—2019
NordC	3590	1952—2019
OAPEC	3800	1968—2019
OAS	3900	1951—2019
OECD	3750	1950—2019
OECS	3830	1968—2019
OIC	3850	1970—2019
OIF	270	1970—2019
OPEC	3840	1960—2019
OSCE	3770	1973—2019
OTIF	1090	1950—2019
PCA	3940	1950—2019
PIF	4200	1973—2019
SAARC	4170	1986—2019
SACU	4240	1969—2019
SADC	4250	1982—2019
SCO	5550	2002—2019
SELA	3390	1976—2019
SICA	990	1952—2019
SPC	4190	1950—2019
UN	4400	1950—2019
UNESCO	4410	1950—2019
UNIDO	4420	1985—2019
UNWTO	4570	1975—2019
UPU	4430	1950—2019
WCO	1650	1952—2019
WHO	4550	1950—2019
WIPO	4560	1970—2019
WMO	4530	1950—2019
WTO	4580	1995—2019

