

Online appendix

Appendix A: List of regional international organizations (1950-2010)

Acronym ¹	Name of RIO	Years in dataset
CAN	Andean Pact/Andean Community of Nations	42
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	20
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	44
BENELUX	Benelux Community	61
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	43
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Union	45
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	19
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	23
COE	Council of Europe	61
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	29
EAC-1	East African Community prior to 1977	10
EAC-2	East African Community from 1996 onwards	15
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	26
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	36
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	51
EU	European Community/European Union	59
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	13
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	25
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association	51
LOAS	League of Arab States	61
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South	20
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement	17
NordC	Nordic Council	59
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	43
OAS	Organization of American States	60
AU	Organization of African Unity/African Union	48
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	43
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum	36
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	25
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	42
SADC	Southern African Development Community	29
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	9
SELA	Latin American Economic System	45
SICA	Central American Integration System	59
SPC	South Pacific Community	61

¹ Acronyms refer to the most recent incarnation of the organization.

Appendix B: Coding of dependent variable *Delegation*

The dependent variable, *Delegation*, measures delegation by member states to non-state bodies in the decision making process for each year of a regional international organization's existence. We assess delegation to a) a range of organized bodies (general secretariats, consultative bodies, assemblies, executives), b) that are primarily or wholly composed of non-member state representatives and that have authority over c) agenda setting and final decision making in d) six decision areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, policy making. Involvement in the final decision is weighted more heavily (1) than involvement in agenda setting (0.5).

A. Delegation to the general secretariat

Every RIO in the dataset has a secretariat with infrastructural functions such as running the IO's headquarters, organizing meetings, and maintaining records. However, the extent to which the secretariat carries out executive functions, monitors compliance, and facilitates member state bargaining varies considerably. In the domain of accession, for example, a secretariat may be charged with soliciting or vetting candidates, evaluating whether a prospective member meets accession criteria, or negotiating the conditions of accession. A general secretariat cannot reasonably be expected to be a final decision maker, and so our coding assesses the extent to which the secretariat can go beyond the infrastructural functions to be an agenda setter.

- **GS1: *Membership accession*.** Is the secretariat authorized to vet, solicit, or negotiate membership of the IO (0, 1)?
- **GS2: *Constitutional amendments*.** Is the secretariat authorized to initiate or negotiate constitutional amendments (0, 1)?
- **GS3: *Substantive non-compliance*.** Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal proceeding against a member state in non-compliance with IO rules (0, 1)?
- **GS4: *Financial non-compliance*.** Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal proceeding against a member state in financial arrears (0, 1)?
- **GS5: *Drafting the budget*.** Is the secretariat authorized to (co-)draft the annual budget of the IO (0, 1)?
- **GS6: *Policy initiation*.** Is the secretariat authorized to propose one or more of the following: recommendations, resolutions, or declarations; programs or projects; laws, regulations, decisions, or directives; protocols or conventions (0, 1)?
- **GS7: *Monopoly of policy initiation*.** Is the role of the secretariat in initiating policy a) not mandated; b) mandated by the IO's founding document and shared with other bodies; c) anchored in the IO's founding document and exclusive (0, 0.5, 1)?
- **GS8: *Executive powers*.** Is the secretariat of the IO authorized to carry out executive functions, such as framing multi-year strategic plans, drafting policy, or turning general legislation into directives or executive orders (0, 1)?
- **GS9: *Monopoly of executive powers*.** Does the secretariat monopolize these powers or does it share them with another body (0, 1)?

GS_Delegation is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 (maximum delegation) and rescaled from 0 to 1.

B. Delegation to a nonstate Assembly or a nonstate Executive

Most assemblies are member state bodies, but a handful of regional organizations have non-state assemblies wholly or partially composed of directly or indirectly elected public officials, representatives of subnational governments, or transnational interest groups. To meet our criterion these bodies must be a) formally recognized as an assembly in the regional organization's founding document, and b) endowed with some deliberative, legislative, appointment, or control functions. The assembly is a supreme body; while it is often involved in determining other RIO bodies, it is itself not determined by them.

Executives are considered non-state if there is a formal arms-length relationship between the body and member states. This could be because of the composition of the body or because the formal rules governing representation in the body. The condition is met if fewer than 100 percent of members are selected by member governments, for example, because members are co-appointed by the head of the general secretariat or an elected assembly and a member state body; because an international secretariat takes up executive functions; or because an independent expert or court body is involved. The condition is also met when member state representation is indirect, that is, representatives do not receive voting instructions by their government, or they take an oath of independence, or they are constitutionally bound to act on behalf of the organization's interest rather than particularistic interests.

- *Membership accession*
 - AS1_a, EX1_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate accession (0, 0.5) ?
 - AS1_b, EX1_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final decision on membership (0, 1)?
- *Constitutional reform*
 - AS2_a, EX2_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate amendments (0, 0.5)?
 - AS2_b, EX2_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final decision on constitutional amendment (0, 1)?
- *Membership suspension*
 - AS3_a, EX3_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate procedures against a non-compliant member state (suspension) (0, 0.5)?
 - AS3_b, EX3_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final decision on procedures against a non-compliant member state (suspension) (0, 1)?
- *Budgetary non compliance*
 - AS4_a, EX4_a: Can the nonstate assembly/ executive initiate (non---technocratic) procedures against a member state in financial arrears (budgetary non--- compliance) (0, 0.5)?
 - AS4_b, EX4_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final decision on procedures a member state in financial arrears (budgetary non-compliance) (0, 1)?

- *Budgetary allocation*
 - AS5_a, EX5_a: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive draft the budget (0, 0.5)?
 - AS5_b, EX5_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive (co-)take the final decision on the budget (0, 1)?
- *Policy making*
 - AS6_a, EX6_a: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive play a role in initiating policy (0, 0.5)?
 - AS6_b, EX6_b: Does the nonstate assembly/ executive take the decision on policy (0, 1)?

Assembly_role summates scores for these items ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 (maximal delegation).

Executive_role summates scores for these items ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 (maximal delegation).

C. Delegation to consultative bodies

Delegation can be to a standing channel or consultative body composed of non-member state representatives where the consultative body a) has some formal status, e.g. it is incorporated in the treaty or convention, in a separate protocol, or on the IO's organigram or website as a formal consultative body; b) possesses formal rights of consultation on a regular, predictable basis; c) is composed of non-state representatives.

Consultative_role summates the maximum score for consultative body on each of these items ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 (maximal delegation).

D. Delegation to judicial bodies

Finally, delegation can be to a judicial body, which refers to the existence of legally binding third party adjudication to resolve disputes and enforce compliance to the terms of a contract. By disputes about the contract we mean disputes about the interpretation of the major treaty, protocol, legal instruments or policy output. These can involve disagreements among member states, member states and a non-state body, or member states and private parties.

Judicial delegation is an additive six-point scale. The first five components are adopted from James McCall Smith (2000). The sixth dimension was added after consulting experts. Each component is scaled from zero to one.

- *Is there automatic right for third-party review of dispute* (0, 0.5, 1)? A regional organization scores 1 if a member state can initiate litigation over the objections of the party litigated against (automatic right); and 0.5 if access to third party dispute settlement depends on the consent of a political body.
- *Is the composition of the tribunal ad hoc or standing* (0, 0.5, 1)? Regional organizations with a standing tribunal score 1; ad hoc tribunals score 0.5.
- *Are rulings binding, conditionally binding or nonbinding* (0, 0.5, 1)? Our assessment is based on explicit language in the treaty, convention or protocol that sets up the dispute settlement mechanism. Conditional bindingness is applicable

when: a) a state consents *ex ante* to bindingness; b) or a state can register a derogation or exception; c) or a decision requires *post hoc* approval by a political body.

- *Do non-state actors have access to dispute settlement* (0, 1)? Under non-state actors are understood third-party international organizations, parliaments, trade, business or public interest groups, or individuals. Access means they can take a member state or a body of the regional organization to court for violation of rights that evolve from the contract.
- *Can a remedy be imposed* (0, 0.5, 1)? Regional organizations score 1 if rulings take direct effect, that is, they bind domestic courts to act; they score 0.5 if states are authorized to take retaliatory sanctions.
- *Is there a preliminary ruling system* (0, 0.5, 1)? Regional organizations score 1 if preliminary rulings are compulsory, that is, domestic courts must refer cases of potential conflict between national and supranational law to the supranational court or must abide by supranational rulings; and 0.5 if preliminary rulings are optional.

Delegation is an additive scale whereby each of the delegation components counts equally. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.81 which indicates relatively high scalability.

Appendix C: Coding of independent variable *Active EU influence*

- Component 1: Funding

The first component is the EU's financial support to other RIOs, which is the main way in which the Community shapes incentives for institutional change. EU funding is an ordinal variable (with four categories) that captures the amount of funding directed to a specific RIO in a given year, encompassing both institutional and project support ($x < 1$ million €; $1 < x < 4$ million €; $4 < x < 8$ million €; $x > 8$ million €). Funding streams were coded on the basis of a variety of official documents, primarily issued by the EU itself such as regional strategy papers, interregional funding agreements etc. We augmented this data with information from the RIOs themselves, for example in the form of press statements, website entries or meeting records that document significant EU funding streams.

About half of the organizations have not received any funding from the EU during their lifespan, including the Pacific Island Forum, The European Free Trade Association, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, the Latin American Integration Association, COMECON and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Among the most heavily funded organizations are the Council of Europe, Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the Southern African Development Community.

- Component 2: Interregional agreements

The second component is EU interregional cooperation agreements, a more indirect way by which active EU influence shapes incentives for institutional change. Institutionalized cooperation measures the policy scope and obligation of all of the EU's agreements with other RIOs in our dataset based upon the assumption that interregional agreements with a wider policy scope and a higher degree of obligation are more likely to exert effects of institutional feedback. We assess an interregional agreement's policy scope based on a list of 29 policy areas. This list was adapted from a classification scheme used by Hooghe and Marks (2015) to account for the specificities of *interregional* cooperation. We record cooperation in a specific policy area when the agreement explicitly codifies substantive cooperation in the main body of the agreement. The binding nature of cooperation is assessed on a three-point scale that measures the nature of obligations associated with cooperation (non-binding versus binding), as well as the existence of interregional monitoring institutions, which forms the highest category of obligation. Our institutionalized cooperation score is the sum of the two standardized components of policy scope and obligation.

We assess a total of 15 agreements that between them involve nine different RIOs. This assessment excludes recent *Interim* Economic Partnership Agreements with African sub-regions because they tend to include only a subset of members. At the low end of the spectrum are agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (1989) and the Andean Pact (1983), both of which are relatively narrow in scope and involve no binding commitments. At the other end of the spectrum are agreements with the Central American Integration System (2003) and the African Union (2007), both of which involve binding commitments.

- Component 3: Institutionalized contacts

The third component is the frequency of institutionalized contacts between the EU and an RIO. EU contacts is a count of instances of institutionalized contacts between EU representatives and their counterparts in a given year across three levels: (1) ministers and heads of state; (2) parliamentarians; and, (3) technical experts, including representatives of the European Commission. The count assumes a value of three when all three sets of actors met in a given year, and zero when none of them met, or when no institutionalization of contacts took place. Contacts were coded on the basis of a variety of documents such as meeting programs, draft agendas, calendars or “history documents” of delegations with specific ROs, joint or final communiqués of interregional meetings as well as annual reports. We augmented this data with website entries from both sides and elicited further information by email in case there were uncertainties about or glaring gaps in the assembled record.

The EU has had institutionalized contacts with 22 out of the 34 organizations in our dataset, but their frequency and intensity has varied strongly. Perhaps unsurprisingly, interregional meetings between technical experts are the most frequent overall, followed by meetings between parliamentarians. In terms of organizations, the most frequent contacts are with the European Free Trade Association and the African Union. At the other end of the spectrum, the EU has some contact with both the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting States and the Organization of American States, but these are rather low level and much less frequent.

Appendix D

Summary statistics

	Observations	Mean	SD	Min	Max
RIO delegation	1278	0.134	0.099	0	0.452
Active EU influence	1278	0.223	0.195	0	1
Passive EU influence	1278	0.53	0.056	0	0.58
Passive EU influence (alt)	1278	0.195	0.18	0	0.543
Contractual incompleteness	1278	2.082	0.734	1	3
Regional delegation	1269	0.132	0.065	0	0.325
Global delegation	1278	0.127	0.043	0.025	0.217
Cold War	1278	0.517	0.499	0	1
RIO globalization	993	49.241	14.723	22.429	90.156
Intra-RIO trade	1066	14.370	16.559	0	72.12
Power asymmetry	1272	4.875	4.196	1	22.927
Members	1278	12.129	10.5	3	52
Democracy	1264	13.297	6.198	1.333	21
GDP	1272	7934.7	9643.04	185.7	59922.96

Correlation matrix

	RIO delegation	Active EU influence	Passive EU influence	Contractual incompleteness	Democracy	Intra-RIO trade	GDP	Power asymmetry	Members	Regional delegation	Global delegation	Cold War	Globalization
RIO delegation	1.0000												
Active EU influence	0.3569	1.0000											
Passive EU influence	0.2408	0.3151	1.0000										
Contractual incompleteness	0.4043	0.4011	0.0405	1.0000									
Democracy	0.2456	0.1437	0.1395	-0.0618	1.0000								
Intra-RIO trade	-0.0055	-0.0053	0.0938	0.0232	0.2991	1.0000							
GDP	0.0170	0.0041	0.1506	-0.0779	0.1148	0.0431	1.0000						
Power asymmetry	0.0255	-0.1831	0.0284	-0.0260	0.0026	0.3822	-0.0826	1.0000					
Members	0.0541	-0.1386	-0.0088	0.1555	-0.1465	0.3556	-0.1025	0.6412	1.0000				
Regional delegation	-0.0286	-0.0365	-0.0085	-0.0052	-0.0202	0.0033	-0.0517	0.0187	0.0173	1.0000			
Global delegation	0.0996	0.1112	0.4428	0.0235	0.0828	0.0639	0.1297	0.0107	-0.0063	-0.0279	1.0000		
Cold War	-0.1897	-0.2796	-0.8126	-0.0565	-0.1556	-0.0899	-0.0924	-0.0221	0.0051	-0.0240	-0.4360	1.0000	
Globalization	0.0381	0.0310	0.0422	0.0369	-0.0059	0.0351	0.1595	-0.0077	-0.0139	0.0415	0.0596	-0.1438	1.0000

Appendix E.1: EU influence and delegation in regional international organizations, Including individual components of active EU influence variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
EU contacts	0.245*** (0.083)		
EU funding		0.128** (0.060)	
Agreements			0.014** (0.006)
Regional delegation	-0.122 (0.232)	-0.250 (0.233)	-0.196 (0.225)
Cold War	-0.065 (0.084)	-0.085 (0.084)	-0.061 (0.079)
Intra-RIO trade	0.014 (0.011)	0.013 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)
Power asymmetry	0.039 (0.048)	0.041 (0.046)	0.034 (0.050)
Members	0.013 (0.012)	0.004 (0.014)	0.020 (0.014)
RO globalization	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.013)
Democracy	0.040 (0.033)	0.038 (0.035)	0.042 (0.034)
GDP	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Global delegation	-0.929 (1.707)	-1.476 (1.562)	-1.427 (1.513)
Constant	-3.582*** (0.639)	-3.049*** (0.725)	-3.281*** (0.664)
R2 - within	0.294	0.302	0.285
R2 - between	0.000	0.002	0.001
R2 - overall	0.041	0.061	0.043

Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$;

Appendix E.2: Determinants of active and passive EU influence, Robustness check to control for reverse causality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Contractual incompleteness	0.000 (0.011)				
RIO delegation		0.006 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)		
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>			0.009 (0.008)		
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>			0.011 (0.009)		
Regional delegation	0.009 (0.022)	0.012 (0.022)	0.013 (0.022)	-0.031 (0.022)	-0.626 (0.514)
Global delegation	0.378 (0.252)	0.370 (0.269)	0.384 (0.275)		
Cold War	-0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.004)	-2.008*** (0.111)
Intra-RIO trade	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.033* (0.018)
Power asymmetry	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.125*** (0.044)
Members	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.011 (0.016)
RIO globalization	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.026 (0.019)
EU globalization				0.000 (0.000)	0.008 (0.011)
Democracy	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.069*** (0.021)
GDP	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	-0.011 (0.021)	0.010 (0.015)	0.011 (0.018)	0.472*** (0.017)	-3.925*** (0.401)
R2 - within	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.495	0.797
R2 - between	0.047	0.085	0.008	0.000	0.032
R2 - overall	0.004	0.006	0.000	0.073	0.352

Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; (1) contractual incompleteness (2) active EU influence (3) active EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness (4) passive EU influence and globalization (5) alternate passive EU influence and globalization.

Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international organizations, Robustness check that excludes European RIOs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Contract	1.291*** (0.282)						
Active EU influence		0.859** (0.340)	0.604** (0.262)			0.691* (0.351)	0.496* (0.281)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>			-0.255 (0.974)				-0.150 (0.354)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>			0.489* (0.255)				1.205** (0.585)
Passive EU influence				5.860*** (1.293)	3.266** (1.457)	4.484*** (1.217)	2.874** (1.259)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>					1.387 (0.891)		0.502 (1.243)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>					3.677*** (0.982)		3.860*** (1.056)
Regional delegation	-0.049 (0.174)	-0.005 (0.254)	-0.143 (0.199)	-0.015 (0.259)	-0.208 (0.224)	-0.006 (0.254)	-0.181 (0.184)
Global delegation	6.726** (2.667)	6.335** (3.038)	0.647 (2.376)	1.743 (2.801)	-3.391 (2.646)	1.968 (2.721)	-4.615 (2.768)
RIO globalization	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.011)	0.007 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.008)
Cold War	-0.089 (0.082)	-0.009 (0.126)	-0.101 (0.085)	-0.130 (0.107)	0.027 (0.058)	-0.121 (0.117)	0.045 (0.072)
Intra-RIO trade	0.021* (0.010)	0.021* (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.018* (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	0.017* (0.010)	0.012 (0.008)
Power asymmetry	-0.002 (0.045)	0.032 (0.051)	0.018 (0.048)	0.000 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.042)	0.014 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.042)
Members	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.015)	0.009 (0.016)	0.014 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	0.010 (0.014)	0.006 (0.011)
Democracy	0.027 (0.024)	0.034 (0.038)	0.020 (0.026)	0.035 (0.034)	0.013 (0.018)	0.027 (0.037)	0.005 (0.017)
GDP	0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-5.82*** (0.687)	-3.46*** (0.792)	-3.17*** (0.469)	-6.15*** (0.835)	-5.29*** (0.682)	-5.49*** (0.943)	-5.06*** (0.634)
R2 - within	0.432	0.356	0.427	0.348	0.520	0.385	0.604
R2 - between	0.212	0.010	0.000	0.004	0.336	0.005	0.334
R2 - overall	0.206	0.069	0.057	0.042	0.272	0.083	0.283

Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; (7) active and passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness.

Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international organizations, Robustness check with alternative measure of passive EU influence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Active EU influence			0.720** (0.281)	0.627*** (0.225)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>				-0.183 (0.878)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>				0.709*** (0.253)
Passive EU influence (alt)	0.153*** (0.045)	0.134* (0.069)	0.113*** (0.040)	0.087** (0.036)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>		0.039 (0.080)		-0.091 (0.086)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>		0.008 (0.080)		0.047 (0.039)
Regional delegation	-0.221 (0.239)	-0.254 (0.201)	-0.093 (0.216)	-0.164 (0.175)
Global delegation	5.618** (2.681)	5.615** (2.660)	4.457 (2.629)	-1.839 (2.354)
RIO globalization	0.006 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)
Cold War	-0.239*** (0.059)	-0.244*** (0.062)	-0.207*** (0.056)	-0.107** (0.047)
Intra-RIO trade	0.009 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.009 (0.009)	0.016* (0.009)
Power asymmetry	0.009 (0.049)	0.002 (0.045)	0.019 (0.046)	-0.017 (0.044)
Members	0.014 (0.010)	0.015 (0.012)	0.012 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)
Democracy	0.035 (0.036)	0.036 (0.036)	0.028 (0.036)	0.013 (0.026)
GDP	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-2.413*** (0.740)	-2.405*** (0.764)	-2.634*** (0.716)	-2.522*** (0.562)
R2 - within	0.302	0.305	0.346	0.434
R2 - between	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.057
R2 - overall	0.049	0.057	0.086	0.143

Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; (1) passive EU influence; (2) passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (3) active and passive EU influence; (4) active and passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness.

Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international organizations, Robustness check with EU influence variables lagged by two years

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Contractual incompleteness	1.204*** (0.216)						
Active EU influence		0.769*** (0.262)	0.536*** (0.121)			0.591** (0.274)	0.481*** (0.172)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>			-0.197 (1.058)				-0.134 (0.311)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>			0.610* (0.346)				1.368* (0.799)
Passive EU influence				5.855*** (1.200)	3.969*** (1.333)	4.740*** (1.185)	3.015** (1.440)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>					1.383 (0.835)		0.688 (0.750)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>					3.921*** (0.868)		4.438*** (1.022)
Regional delegation	-0.373* (0.203)	-0.139 (0.210)	-0.071 (0.209)	-0.199 (0.238)	-0.257 (0.197)	-0.105 (0.219)	-0.219 (0.179)
Global delegation	2.481 (2.085)	2.182 (2.581)	1.938 (2.469)	-2.116 (1.995)	-2.506 (2.388)	-2.049 (2.007)	-2.133 (2.490)
RIO globalization	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.010)
Cold War	-0.099 (0.065)	-0.027 (0.084)	-0.061 (0.063)	-0.132 (0.085)	-0.066 (0.048)	-0.134 (0.087)	-0.072 (0.047)
Intra-RIO trade	0.018* (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	0.012 (0.008)	0.015 (0.009)	0.008 (0.007)	0.015 (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)
Power asymmetry	0.007 (0.039)	0.037 (0.041)	0.022 (0.043)	0.010 (0.039)	-0.019 (0.036)	0.019 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.033)
Members	0.016 (0.009)	0.012 (0.014)	0.013 (0.015)	0.013 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	0.011 (0.013)	0.008 (0.010)
Democracy	0.027 (0.021)	0.035 (0.031)	0.024 (0.026)	0.035 (0.028)	0.015 (0.018)	0.029 (0.030)	0.009 (0.016)
GDP	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-5.46*** (0.512)	-3.34*** (0.626)	-2.98*** (0.475)	-6.08*** (0.794)	-5.53*** (0.615)	-5.55*** (0.865)	-5.06*** (0.578)
R2 - within	0.349	0.306	0.374	0.314	0.501	0.343	0.575
R2 - between	0.195	0.001	0.028	0.006	0.263	0.000	0.250
R2 - overall	0.143	0.047	0.118	0.042	0.220	0.062	0.201

Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; (7) active and passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness.

Appendix E.2: EU influence and delegation in regional international organizations, Robustness check with EU influence variables lagged by four years

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Contractual incompleteness	1.068*** (0.112)						
Active EU influence		0.662*** (0.222)	0.511*** (0.118)			0.460* (0.234)	0.425** (0.182)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>			-0.125 (0.989)				-0.162 (0.327)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>			0.525 (0.350)				1.475 (0.878)
Passive EU influence				6.070*** (1.478)	4.210*** (1.309)	5.172*** (1.536)	3.342** (1.425)
* <i>Intermediate contract</i>					1.128 (0.816)		0.444 (0.826)
* <i>Open-ended contract</i>					3.456*** (0.872)		4.104*** (1.086)
Regional delegation	0.076 (0.496)	0.292 (0.482)	-0.088 (0.203)	0.251 (0.466)	-0.258 (0.195)	0.324 (0.457)	-0.234 (0.176)
Global delegation	0.988 (1.433)	1.905 (2.433)	4.589* (2.634)	-3.009* (1.628)	-0.008 (2.411)	-2.887* (1.545)	0.060 (2.128)
RIO globalization	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.008)
Cold War	-0.128* (0.069)	-0.060 (0.082)	-0.043 (0.074)	-0.113 (0.101)	-0.089 (0.059)	-0.113 (0.103)	-0.094 (0.060)
Intra-RIO trade	0.010 (0.012)	0.010 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.005 (0.009)	0.007 (0.007)	0.005 (0.009)	0.005 (0.006)
Power asymmetry	0.009 (0.034)	0.033 (0.032)	0.029 (0.043)	0.006 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.034)	0.013 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.031)
Members	0.017 (0.010)	0.014 (0.014)	0.012 (0.015)	0.015 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	0.013 (0.013)	0.008 (0.010)
Democracy	0.028 (0.017)	0.034 (0.024)	0.028 (0.027)	0.032 (0.020)	0.018 (0.018)	0.027 (0.022)	0.013 (0.018)
GDP	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-5.13*** (0.303)	-3.22*** (0.526)	-3.08*** (0.533)	-6.06*** (0.913)	-5.6*** (0.628)	-5.65*** (0.981)	-5.21*** (0.617)
R2 - within	0.285	0.263	0.339	0.289	0.453	0.305	0.522
R2 - between	0.178	0.010	0.027	0.001	0.240	0.003	0.224
R2 - overall	0.130	0.066	0.111	0.077	0.209	0.098	0.183

Notes: All models use fixed effects and robust standard errors (in parentheses); * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; (1) contractual incompleteness; (2) active EU influence; (3) active EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (4) passive EU influence; (5) passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness; (6) active and passive EU influence; (7) active and passive EU influence interacted with contractual incompleteness.