

Online Appendix

Appendix A. List of regional international organizations (1950-2010)

Acronym	Name	Age at adoption of parliamentary institution
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	4
CAN	Andean Community of Nations	16
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	44
BENELUX	Benelux Community	13
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	29
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Union	35
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	4
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	
COE	Council of Europe	1
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	
EAC-1	East African Community, pre-1977	1
EAC-2	East African Community, post-1996	10
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	26
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	28
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	18
EU	European Community/European Union	1
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association	
LOAS	League of Arab States	63
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South	5
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement	
NordC	Nordic Council	
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	
OAS	Organization of American States	
AU	African Union	42
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum	
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	
SADC	Southern African Development Community	17
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	
SELA	Latin American Economic System	
SICA	Central American Integration System	41
SPC	South Pacific Community	

Appendix B. Coding of independent variables

A. Delegation to the general secretariat

Every regional organization in the dataset has a secretariat with infrastructural functions such as running the IO's headquarters, organizing meetings, and maintaining records. However, the extent to which the secretariat carries out executive functions, monitors compliance, and facilitates member state bargaining varies considerably. In the domain of accession, for example, a secretariat may be charged with soliciting or vetting candidates, evaluating whether a prospective member meets accession criteria, or negotiating the conditions of accession. A general secretariat cannot reasonably be expected to be a final decision maker, and so our coding assesses the extent to which the secretariat can go beyond the infrastructural functions to be an agenda setter.

- **GS1: *Membership accession.*** Is the secretariat authorized to vet, solicit, or negotiate membership of the IO (0, 1)?
- **GS2: *Constitutional amendments.*** Is the secretariat authorized to initiate or negotiate constitutional amendments (0, 1)?
- **GS3: *Substantive non-compliance.*** Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal proceeding against a member state in non-compliance with IO rules (0, 1)?
- **GS4: *Financial non-compliance.*** Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal proceeding against a member state in financial arrears (0, 1)?
- **GS5: *Drafting the budget.*** Is the secretariat authorized to (co-)draft the annual budget of the IO (0, 1)?

- **GS6: *Policy initiation***. Is the secretariat authorized to propose one or more of the following: recommendations, resolutions, or declarations; programs or projects; laws, regulations, decisions, or directives; protocols or conventions (0, 1)?
- **GS7: *Monopoly of policy initiation***. Is the role of the secretariat in initiating policy a) not mandated; b) mandated by the IO's founding document and shared with other bodies; c) anchored in the IO's founding document and exclusive (0, 0.5, 1)?
- **GS8: *Executive powers***. Is the secretariat of the IO authorized to carry out executive functions, such as framing multi-year strategic plans, drafting policy, or turning general legislation into directives or executive orders (0, 1)?
- **GS9: *Monopoly of executive powers***. Does the secretariat monopolize these powers or does it share them with another body (0, 1)?

Delegation is calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 9 (maximum delegation) and rescaled from 0 to 1. This measure draws on data from Hooghe et al. (2017).

B. EU engagement

The variable *EU engagement* draws on data from Lenz and Burilkov (2017) and consists of two components that are weighted equally in the index, but we run robustness checks with the individual components.

- Component 1: Funding

The first component is the EU's financial support to other regional organizations. EU funding is an ordinal variable (with four categories) that captures the amount of funding directed to a specific organization in a given year, encompassing both

institutional and project support ($x < 1$ million €; $1 < x < 4$ million €; $4 < x < 8$ million €; $x > 8$ million €). Funding streams were coded on the basis of a variety of official documents, primarily issued by the EU itself such as regional strategy papers, interregional funding agreements etc. We augmented this data with information from the respective organizations themselves, for example in the form of press statements, website entries or meeting records that document significant EU funding streams.

About half of the organizations have not received any funding from the EU during their lifespan, including the Pacific Island Forum, The European Free Trade Association, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, the Latin American Integration Association, COMECON and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Among the most heavily funded organizations are the Council of Europe, Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the Southern African Development Community.

- Component 2: Institutionalized contacts

The second component is the frequency of institutionalized contacts between the EU and representatives of other organizations. EU contacts is a count of instances of institutionalized contacts between EU representatives and their counterparts in a given year across three levels: (1) ministers and heads of state; (2) parliamentarians; and, (3) technical experts, including representatives of the European Commission. The count assumes a value of three when all three sets of actors met in a given year, and zero when none of them met, or when no institutionalization of contacts took place.

Contacts were coded on the basis of a variety of documents such as meeting programs, draft agendas, calendars or “history documents” of delegations with specific regional organizations, joint or final communiqués of interregional meetings as well as annual

reports. We augmented this data by website entries and elicited further information by email in case there were uncertainties about or glaring gaps in the assembled record.

The EU has had institutionalized contacts with 22 out of the 35 organizations in our dataset, but their frequency and intensity has varied strongly. Perhaps unsurprisingly, interregional meetings between technical experts are the most frequent overall, followed by meetings between parliamentarians. In terms of organizations, the most frequent contacts are with the European Free Trade Association and the African Union. At the other end of the spectrum, the EU has some contact with both the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting States and the Organization of American States, but these are rather low level and much less frequent.

C. Democratic hegemony

Democratic and democratizing hegemon controls are constructed similarly. An organization is considered to have a democratic hegemon if any of its member states has a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) larger than two standard deviations from the organization's mean GDP, and if it is a full democracy or democracy according to the Polity IV dataset. A regional organization is considered to have a democratizing hegemon if any of its member states has a nominal GDP larger than two standard deviations from the organization's mean GDP, and if this state is an open anocracy (according to Polity IV), whose democracy score has increased in the past five years.

Appendix C. Correlation Matrix

Regional parliamentarization	1.000											
Delegation	0.748 (0.000)	1.000										
Pooling	0.292 (0.000)	0.348 (0.000)	1.000									
Average democracy	0.249 (0.000)	0.315 (0.000)	-0.229 (0.000)	1.000								
Democratic density	0.246 (0.000)	0.367 (0.000)	-0.308 (0.000)	0.908 (0.000)	1.000							
EU engagement	0.210 (0.000)	0.226 (0.000)	0.078 (0.005)	0.047 (0.093)	-0.018 (0.582)	1.000						
Regional emulation	0.574 (0.000)	0.576 (0.000)	0.208 (0.000)	0.355 (0.000)	0.323 (0.000)	0.073 (0.008)	1.000					
Global emulation	0.236 (0.000)	0.297 (0.000)	0.205 (0.000)	0.128 (0.000)	-0.017 (0.577)	0.170 (0.000)	0.456 (0.000)	1.000				
Post-1990	0.175 (0.000)	0.214 (0.000)	0.166 (0.000)	0.138 (0.000)	-0.016 (0.599)	0.242 (0.000)	0.363 (0.000)	0.797 (0.000)	1.000			
GDP/capita	0.254 (0.000)	0.235 (0.000)	-0.099 (0.002)	0.571 (0.000)	0.425 (0.000)	0.023 (0.492)	0.548 (0.000)	0.065 (0.047)	0.052 (0.109)	1.000		
Democratic hegemon	-0.060 (0.053)	-0.027 (0.376)	-0.066 (0.032)	0.381 (0.000)	0.374 (0.000)	-0.053 (0.094)	-0.102 (0.001)	0.112 (0.000)	0.099 (0.001)	0.046 (0.161)	1.000	
Democratizing hegemon	0.107 (0.000)	0.042 (0.179)	0.056 (0.072)	0.007 (0.829)	0.028 (0.365)	0.038 (0.233)	-0.025 (0.426)	0.062 (0.045)	0.027 (0.377)	-0.143 (0.000)	0.006 (0.856)	1.000

p-values in parenthesis

Appendix D.1. Determinants of Regional Parliamentarization, Disaggregated *EU Engagement*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
EU funding	2.639*** (0.749)		
EU contacts		2.198** (0.766)	
EU parliamentary contacts			1.028*** (0.009)
Regional emulation	1.069*** (0.024)	1.046*** (0.017)	1.024 (0.018)
Global emulation	1.035 (0.045)	1.046 (0.042)	1.077* (0.043)
Post-1990	1.458 (1.551)	1.793 (2.036)	1.756 (1.775)
Democratizing hegemon	2.007 (0.924)	2.949** (1.447)	5.710*** (3.459)
Democratic hegemon	0.799 (0.449)	0.689 (0.466)	0.628 (0.396)
GDP/capita	0.656 (0.185)	0.777 (0.166)	0.665* (0.165)
N	619	619	619
Wald chi2	45.626	39.769	39.262
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Survival analysis, Cox proportional hazard models; exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D.2. Determinants of Regional Parliamentarization, Stratified by Age

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pooling	0.006 (0.019)				
Delegation	1.142*** (0.035)				1.104*** (0.033)
Average democracy		1.135 (0.107)			0.935 (0.100)
Democratic density			5.106 (6.830)		
EU engagement				1.762*** (0.278)	1.669*** (0.281)
Regional emulation				1.060*** (0.022)	1.055* (0.031)
Global emulation	1.024 (0.041)	1.069* (0.040)	1.063 (0.040)	1.042 (0.045)	1.007 (0.061)
Post-1990	3.856 (3.209)	2.066 (2.220)	2.423 (2.493)	1.763 (1.955)	2.168 (2.477)
Democratizing hegemon	4.839** (3.025)	2.497** (1.028)	2.756** (1.146)	2.277* (1.022)	4.194** (2.615)
Democratic hegemon	0.656 (0.518)	0.284* (0.203)	0.301* (0.210)	0.684 (0.432)	0.589 (0.567)
GDP/capita	1.047 (0.278)	0.695 (0.158)	0.738 (0.163)	0.725 (0.172)	1.245 (0.382)
N	619	619	619	619	619
Wald chi2	34.639	31.923	33.443	54.660	91.541
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Survival analysis, Cox proportional hazard models; exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D.3. Determinants of Regional Parliamentarization, Stratified by Age and Including a Year Count

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pooling	0.012 (0.036)				
Delegation	1.134*** (0.028)				1.112*** (0.034)
Average democracy		1.144 (0.098)			0.917 (0.087)
Democratic density			6.001 (7.937)		
EU engagement				1.720*** (0.235)	1.675*** (0.248)
Regional emulation				1.064*** (0.021)	1.063** (0.030)
Year	1.036 (0.034)	1.059 (0.039)	1.061* (0.036)	1.012 (0.043)	0.986 (0.029)
Democratizing hegemon	5.359*** (3.261)	2.760** (1.161)	3.050*** (1.304)	1.920 (0.909)	3.961** (2.544)
Democratic hegemon	0.705 (0.508)	0.331* (0.217)	0.337 (0.223)	1.046 (0.640)	0.861 (0.611)
GDP/capita	1.050 (0.258)	0.667* (0.148)	0.722 (0.152)	0.597** (0.146)	1.144 (0.349)
N	619	619	619	619	619
Wald chi2	40.818	27.272	23.115	29.602	33.354
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Survival analysis, Cox proportional hazard models; exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D.4. Appendix D.3. Determinants of Regional Parliamentarization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pooling	0.025 (0.061)				
Delegation	1.155*** (0.038)				1.130*** (0.037)
Average democracy		1.078 (0.095)			0.932 (0.091)
Democratic density			3.817 (5.282)		
EU engagement				1.712*** (0.266)	1.455*** (0.199)
Regional emulation				1.046*** (0.016)	1.040* (0.021)
Global emulation	1.029 (0.045)	1.071** (0.036)	1.073** (0.036)	1.042 (0.030)	0.980 (0.051)
Post-1990	3.132 (3.580)	1.488 (1.668)	1.610 (1.749)	1.149 (1.417)	2.482 (3.025)
Democratic hegemon	1.141 (0.772)	0.514 (0.326)	0.476 (0.292)	1.272 (0.850)	1.524 (1.332)
Democratizing hegemon	5.138*** (2.843)	3.902*** (1.633)	4.030*** (1.663)	2.580* (1.411)	2.796 (1.785)
GDP/capita	1.132 (0.364)	0.741 (0.177)	0.738 (0.173)	0.685 (0.175)	1.055 (0.356)
N	619	619	619	619	619
Wald chi2	84.540	43.165	44.422	44.738	85.719
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Survival analysis, Weibull proportional hazard models; exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D.5. Appendix D.3. Determinants of Regional Parliamentarization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pooling	0.031 (0.081)				
Delegation	1.154*** (0.035)				1.130*** (0.035)
Average democracy		1.079 (0.096)			0.918 (0.095)
Democratic density			3.783 (5.108)		
EU engagement				1.731*** (0.254)	1.487*** (0.224)
Regional emulation				1.047*** (0.015)	1.042** (0.021)
Global emulation	1.025 (0.045)	1.071** (0.036)	1.074** (0.036)	1.047 (0.031)	0.977 (0.052)
Post-1990	3.422 (4.113)	1.484 (1.664)	1.609 (1.747)	1.135 (1.377)	3.029 (3.679)
Democratic hegemon	1.180 (0.818)	0.528 (0.333)	0.489 (0.301)	1.276 (0.815)	1.647 (1.513)
Democratizing hegemon	5.230*** (2.925)	3.901*** (1.684)	4.024*** (1.709)	2.751* (1.540)	2.974* (1.882)
GDP/capita	1.170 (0.351)	0.756 (0.179)	0.753 (0.174)	0.738 (0.195)	1.140 (0.374)
N	619	619	619	619	619
Wald chi2	81.533	41.589	45.042	48.778	95.779
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Survival analysis, Gompertz proportional hazard models; exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$