

Appendix

Agents, audiences, and peers: why international organizations diversify their discursive legitimation

Tobias Lenz & Henning Schmidtke

March 2023

This document supplements the information provided in Lenz and Schmidtke's 'Agents, audiences, and peers: why international organizations diversify their discursive legitimation.' It presents the sample of IOs, details the operationalization of variables, shows descriptive statistics and diagnostics, and introduces alternative models not presented in the paper.

Table of Contents

A1 Sample of international organizations	1
A2 Operationalization of variables	2
A2.1 Dependent variable: Normative diversity of discursive legitimation.....	2
<i>Coded documents and coding unit</i>	2
<i>Identifying a legitimation statement</i>	2
<i>Identifying normative standards</i>	3
<i>Construction of dependent variable</i>	12
Distribution of dependent variable	13
A2.2 Independent variables.....	14
<i>Agents-based perspective</i>	14
<i>Audience-based perspective</i>	14
<i>Peers-based perspective</i>	16
<i>Controls</i>	16
A3 Diagnostics	18
A3.1 Correlation matrix.....	18
A3.2 Multicollinearity	19
A4 Main model and robustness checks	20

A1 Sample of international organizations

Acronym	Name	Inception (years in the sample)
Africa		
OAU/ AU	Organization of African Unity/African Union	1963 (40)
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Union	1994 (26)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	1994 (26)
EAC	East African Community	1996 (24)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	1975 (40)
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	1986 (34)
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	2002 (18)
SADC	Southern African Development Community	1980 (40)
Asia-Pacific		
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	1967 (40)
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	1981 (39)
PIF	Pacific Island Forum	1973 (40)
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	1985 (35)
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2001 (19)
Americas		
CAN	Andean Pact/Andean Community	1969 (40)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	1968 (40)
Mercosur	Common Market of the South	1991 (40)
OAS	Organization of American States	1951 (40)
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	1982 (38)
SICA	Central American Integration System	1952 (40)
Europe		
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	1960 (40)
EU	European Union	1952 (40)
NordC	Nordic Council	1952 (40)
COE	Council of Europe	1949 (40)
Cross-Regional		
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	1991 (29)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	1991 (29)
LoAS	League of Arab States	1945 (40)
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	1968 (40)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	1992 (28)

A2 Operationalization of variables

A2.1 Dependent variable: Normative diversity of discursive legitimation

We measure the normative diversity of discursive legitimation with the help of data generated within the ‘LegRO’ project.¹ As detailed in the codebook, we tested data reliability for the identification of legitimation statements and the coding of all variables. Reliability tests build on a random sample of approximately five percent of the corpus. For all steps of the coding process, we achieved a Krippendorff’s α of 0.669 or higher.

Coded documents and coding unit

Following the rules of our codebook, we identified 13 normative standards used for legitimation in IO Annual Reports and Communiqués of heads of state and government meetings. We apply a sampling procedure for each document by which we select a number of paragraphs – our coding unit – for coding. We focus on sections in the respective documents that are particularly interesting from a legitimation perspective because they are rich in expressions of commitments to basic principles, key elements of the organization’s philosophy, the organization’s conception of itself, and its desired public image. These sections are limited in number and clearly identifiable: general overviews, summaries, forewords, introductions, and conclusions are usually located at the beginning and the end of the documents. Since the number of paragraphs in the selected sections varies across organizations, we calculate a 25 percent range around the mean number of paragraphs contained in these sections. As a result, we code a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 28 paragraphs per document. Given that we use two types of documents per IO-year, the legitimation communication of an IO each year is represented by a minimum of 32 and a maximum of 56 paragraphs.²

Identifying a legitimation statement

In the first step of the coding process, we decided whether a paragraph makes a legitimation statement based on a stylized legitimation grammar. This grammar takes two different forms. The first one (O-E-S) assumes that legitimation requires a normative assessment of an IO, which contains one necessary and one sufficient component. The necessary component is a positive evaluation (E) of the IO in general, its core bodies, the

¹ For more information on the project and the codebook, see: <https://doi.org/10.7802/2450>.

² For some IO-years, we were not able to obtain both types of documents. For these years, an IO-year is generally represented by a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 28 paragraphs. In some cases, entire documents are shorter than the minimum.

entirety of member states, or a core work program (O). The sufficient component is a normative standard (S) explaining why the IO is legitimate. This conceptualization leads to the following grammar:

The [object of legitimation (O)] is legitimate [normative evaluation (E)]
because [normative standard (S)].

The second grammar (O-I-S) follows the idea that legitimation can also express identity as a commitment to the normative standard.

The [object of legitimation (O) = organization as a whole] is committed
[expression of identity (I)] to [normative standard (S)].

Identifying normative standards

In the second step of the coding process, we coded the normative standards that underpin positive evaluations and identity statements. This step builds on the following rules and definitions.

Democracy

The standard ‘democracy’ contains normative arguments referring to the procedures, purpose, and performance of an IO. Our coding of this normative standard builds on the following definition of democracy: A ‘system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by the citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives;’ or because the IO has improved the democratic quality of its procedures. Following this definition, the democracy standard may highlight popular democracy, representation, participation, transparency, and accountability.³ Procedure legitimation emphasizes that an IO applies democratic rules in its own decision-making and behavior. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to the promotion of democracy within and between states.

Keywords: democracy, cooperation with NGOs/people, democratic institutions, inclusion/involvement of stakeholders/people/NGOs/civil society/non-state actors, popular participation, participation, transparency, accountability, inclusivity, equity, equality, good

³ Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘*What Democracy Is ... and Is Not*’, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 76.

governance, democracy promotion, democratic empowerment, consolidation of democratic institutions/values.

Examples:

- ‘We completed the process of establishing the Court of Justice by appointing the President of the Court, the Judges and the Registrar. This is an important tool in ensuring that our integration arrangements are [...] transparent.’⁴
- ‘The idea is to adopt a positive attitude toward the possibility of cooperating to consolidate democracy and contribute effectively to generating better conditions for good governance.’⁵

Rule of law

The standard ‘rule of law’ contains normative arguments referring to the procedures, purpose, and performance of an IO. Generally, rule of law refers to the formal character of a decision-making process, measured against the legal rules’ background. The rules themselves need not fulfill any substantive criteria. The requirement of the rule of law ensures that all decisions are taken in compliance with the law, thus guaranteeing legal security and preventing unlawful action. Procedure legitimation emphasizes that an IO respects the rules of law in its own decision-making and behavior. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to the promotion of legal institutions within and among member states.

Keywords: (promotion of) international law (governing the relations between states), rules-based, juridification, legalization, legality, we follow the law, implementation of the mandate, convention-based, impunity

Examples:

- ‘In effect, the Charter is expected to move ASEAN from being a loosely-organized political grouping to a rules-based international organization, defining the very nature and direction of ASEAN as it approaches its fourth decade.’⁶

⁴ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, ‘1998 Annual Report’ (Lusaka: COMESA, 1998), p. 5.

⁵ Organization of American States, ‘Annual Report of the Secretary General 2005-2006’ (Washington, D.C.: OAS, 2006), p. 9.

⁶ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Annual Report 2005-2006’ (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2006), p. 2.

- ‘(...) Well beyond the Community there is a European blueprint for society based on the principles of democracy, pluralism and the rule of law which the Community hopes will make headway in every corner of Europe.’⁷

Human rights

The standard ‘human rights’ contains normative arguments referring to the purpose and performance of an IO. Generally, human rights refer to moral principles or norms for certain standards of human behaviour. They are inalienable, fundamental rights to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being and which are inherent in all human beings, regardless of their age, ethnic origin, location, language, religion, ethnicity, or any other status. We code this standard, when legitimation is explicitly framed in terms of rights-based arguments. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to the promotion of such rights.

Keywords: ‘right to ...,’ political rights, human rights, non-discrimination, people’s rights, gender equality, economic rights, individual rights, freedom, liberty, freedom of the press

Examples:

- ‘The European Year (...) celebrated the principles that unite us: the values that we share, the peace and freedom that were so hard won, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and human dignity that can never be taken for granted.’⁸
- ‘We support full inclusivity, equity and equality for all people of the Pacific.’⁹

Environmental protection

The standard ‘environmental protection’ contains normative arguments referring to the purpose and performance of an IO. We understand the environment broadly concerning aspects of humankind’s natural surroundings necessary to maintain its existence as a species. Most things ‘sustainable’ fall into this category when we cannot establish beyond doubt that they do not refer to environmental protection. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks or contributes to enhancing the protection of the environment.

⁷ European Commission, ‘XXIIIrd General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1989’ (Brussels: EU, 1990), p. 25.

⁸ European Union, ‘The EU in 2018’ (Brussels: EU, 2019), p. 6.

⁹ Pacific Island Forum, *2015 Annual Report* (Suva: PIF, 2016), p. 2.

Keywords: Environmental protection, green economy, climate change, sustainable (natural) resource management, sustainable agricultural development, sustainable fisheries development

Examples:

- ‘The Leaders adopted the Statement on Joint Response to Climate Change as a concrete manifestation of ASEAN’s collective commitment to address climate change.’¹⁰
- ‘The Objectives of the East African Co-operation are to: [...] promote sustainable utilisation of the region’s natural resources and put in place measures for effective protection of the environment.’¹¹

National sovereignty

The standard ‘national sovereignty’ contains normative arguments referring to the procedure, purpose, and performance of an IO. This standard can refer both to legal sovereignty (recognition as an independent state according to international law) and to its factual sovereignty (power to take decisions in the domestic and international realm without being dependent on the support/agreement of other actors). Procedure legitimization highlights that an IO’s decisions are controlled by states or taken in a procedure that guarantees/protects the independence and self-determination of *individual* states. Purpose and performance emphasize that an IO is legitimate because it seeks or contributes to enhancing individual states’ autonomy and self-determination in the international system.

Keywords: respect for national sovereignty, non-discrimination against member states, non-interference, sovereign equality, sovereignty (respect of the principle), territorial integrity, responsiveness to member states, contribution to reinforcement/defense of independence/sovereignty/territorial integrity

Examples:

- ‘There is much to be said for the present system of having member-economies assign and pay for professionals working at the Secretariat. This system ensures that the professionals

¹⁰ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Annual Report 2009. Bridging markets, connecting peoples’ (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010), p. 3.

¹¹ East African Community, ‘Report of the Commission on the Progress of East African Co-Operation’ (Arusha: EAC Secretariate, 1996), p. 1.

will remain responsive to the member-economies and avoids the establishment of an independent and possibly unresponsive bureaucracy.’¹²

- ‘The Governments comprising the South Pacific Forum: Reaffirming their belief in the principles of self-determination and independence applying to non self-governing Pacific Island countries, including the French territories.’¹³

Political community

The standard ‘political community’ contains normative arguments referring to the procedure, purpose, and performance of an IO. Generally, a political community builds on a collective identity that consists of a common self-conception of the community and the values, norms, and principles shared by (most of) its members. This self-conception can build on values considered central to the society, a conception of the good life, or the appreciation of cultural diversity. Procedural legitimation emphasizes that an IO builds on or is an expression of a political/cultural community’s collective identity, norms, and principles. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to promoting a political/cultural community’s collective identity.

Keywords: brotherhood, bounds/links/ties (cultural, historical, religious), friendship, pan-ideologies (e.g., Africanism, Arabism), unity (e.g., African, Arab), spirit, shared/common destiny, identity, harmony, solidarity, political cohesion, tolerance

Examples:

- ‘As Large Ocean Island States, the ocean is our way of life.’¹⁴
- ‘In order to enhance its image and identity, the SADC Secretariat finalized the SADC Corporate Identity Manual and the Concept and template for the SADC Communication Media Plan (...).’¹⁵

¹² Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ‘Report of the Executive Director, APEC Secretariat’ (Seattle: APEC, 1993), p. 6.

¹³ Pacific Island Forum, ‘Twelfth South Pacific Forum: Forum Communiqué’ (Port Vila: PIF, 1981), p. 1.

¹⁴ Pacific Island Forum (2016), p. 6.

¹⁵ Southern African Development Community, ‘The Report of the Executive Secretary 2014-2015’ (Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, 2015), p. xiv.

Economic community

The standard ‘economic community’ contains normative arguments referring to the purpose and performance of an IO. This standard entails the ambition to solve a functional problem but explicitly states that this should be done as a group of states/peoples with shared values. It includes sustainable development, which refers specifically to retaining the economic viability of a community and does not entail the management of natural resources. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks or contributes to enhancing economic welfare as a community.

Keywords: economic community, economic union, economic society, sustainable development, (economic) self-reliance, integral development

Examples:

- ‘In the context of the solidarity objective, other initiatives were launched, also relating to the concept of sustainable development.’¹⁶
- ‘An economic community with equitable and sustainable development, dedicated to the welfare of its people for a common future.’¹⁷

Functional capability

The standard ‘functional capability’ contains normative arguments referring to the procedure, purpose, and performance of an IO. This standard entails the resources and institutions an IO requires to perform its tasks. Procedural legitimation emphasizes that an IO possess functional capabilities – such as organizational resources, well-qualified staff, and institutional structures – that enable the IO to perform its tasks. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to promoting the functional capabilities required to achieve its goals.

Keywords: integration, objectivity, neutrality, expert knowledge, technical solutions, expertise, scientific, excellent professionals, high-quality staff, skilled, capability, non-politicized, membership enlargement, well-trained/hard-working/committed/dedicated staff

¹⁶ European Union, ‘General Report on the Activities of the European Union 2006’ (Brussels: EU, 2006), p. 13.

¹⁷ Southern African Customs Union, ‘Implementing a Common Agenda Towards Regional Integration. Annual Report 2014’ (Windhoek: SACU, 2014), p. 3.

Examples:

- ‘In 2000, the 50th anniversary of the Schuman declaration, founding text of the Community structure, was marked by a number of tangible signs of progress in the European integration process.’¹⁸
- ‘[...] thanks to the guidance and assistance of Senior Officials, the excellent professionals assigned by the member economies, the high quality of the support staff and the strong commitment of the Government of Singapore to the Secretariat.’¹⁹

Economic welfare

The standard ‘economic welfare’ contains normative arguments referring to the purpose and performance of an IO. This standard entails the living standards and well being of individuals. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to advancing living standards, also including matters related to the distribution of development outcomes.

Keywords: growth, economic harmonization, economic cooperation/integration/prosperity, fiscal/monetary cooperation, liberalization, market-driven cooperation, trade, living standards/quality of life, socio-economic development, economic well-being, alleviate poverty/suffering, humanitarian aid, education, science, technology, transportation, communication

Examples:

- ‘ASEAN cooperation on issues like road safety, disaster management, pesticide control and combating avian influenza also contributes to a better quality of life in the region.’²⁰
- ‘The Annual Report vividly demonstrates the solid progress that bears testimony to our common resolve to change the status quo in order to improve the standards of living of our people and to guarantee a better future.’²¹

¹⁸ European Union, ‘General Report on the Activities of the European Union 2000’ (Brussels: EU, 2000), p. 1.

¹⁹ Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (1993), p. 1.

²⁰ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2006), p. 1.

²¹ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (1998), p. 5.

Peace and security

The standard ‘peace and security’ contains normative arguments referring to the purpose and performance of an IO. This standard entails the peaceful solution of conflict among individuals and states and avoidance of violence. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it seeks to foster or contributes to enhancing security and peaceful co-existence within and between states.

Keywords: peace, peaceful co-existence, peaceful settlement, non-aggression, non-use/threat of force, dealing with conflicts, security (ensure, promote, foster, achieve), stability

Examples:

- ‘Brunei Darussalam joined the organization on 7 January 1984, adding strength to ASEAN whose avowed aims as enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, are regional peace, progress and prosperity.’²²
- ‘This Secretariat has participated in negotiations to settle differences among our countries peacefully (...). Those negotiations have been carried out under the auspices of the OAS, and we hope that they will serve to encourage other countries to take similar paths.’²³

International influence

The standard ‘international influence’ contains arguments referring to purpose and performance. This standard entails efforts to further the interests of member states as a group and shape international processes, including common positions in international forums and strengthening the region’s role in the international sphere. Purpose and performance legitimation highlights that an IO is legitimate because it aims to promote or contributes to regional interests’ promotion beyond an organization’s borders.

Keywords: (international) influence, coordination of member states, shaping international order/system, strategic position, regional interest

²² Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee 1983-1984’ (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1984), p. 9.

²³ Organization of American States (2006), p. 10.

Examples:

- ‘In the environmental field, it has been agreed that a common ASEAN stand on sustainable development will be adopted by ASEAN representatives in the governing bodies of U.N. agencies, in line with the Manila Declaration of 1987.’²⁴
- ‘Concurrent with these developments, ASEAN continued to build its external partnerships and secured a prominent role for itself in the evolving strategic architecture of East Asia.’²⁵

Structural necessity

The standard ‘structural necessity’ emphasizes that an IO is legitimate because it is indispensable in overcoming an exogenous shock, crisis, or other challenges. This standard seeks legitimation by constructing an imperative for IO authority in the quest for ‘survival.’²⁶ We only code this standard when no other legitimation standards are noted in the statement.

Keywords: a must, resilience, structural necessity, requirement, in times of great difficulty, essential, the need for international cooperation, in times of crisis, there is no alternative

Examples:

- ‘This is a new call for us to become coordinated in this area, and frankly what matters is not to take the initiative or any credit for it, but simply to do our part in an essential undertaking for our countries.’²⁷
- ‘Only if states work together is it possible to solve the major problems of today. This is why the Council of Europe was set up in 1949; it is now Europe’s largest political organisation.’²⁸

External recognition

The standard ‘external recognition’ emphasizes that an IO is legitimate because it is recognized by outside actors who explicitly endorse its work. Such recognizing actors include, for instance, other international organizations, cooperation partners, and non-member states. In other words,

²⁴ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee 1988-1989’ (Jakarta: ASEAN, 1989), p. 8.

²⁵ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2006), p. 2.

²⁶ Dana Landau, Israel Drori, and Siri Terjesen, ‘Multiple legitimacy narratives and planned organizational change’, *Human Relations*, 67: 11, 2014, pp. 1321–45.

²⁷ Organization of American States (2006), p. 12.

²⁸ Council of Europe, ‘Activity Report 2008’ (Strasbourg: COE, 2008), p. 7.

the IO references a normative assessment of the IO by an explicitly named external actor. This implies that the above-presented legitimation grammar must be applicable here, except that the author/speaker of the statement is not the IO itself, but some external actor highlighted by the IO. Statements must be translatable into the generic grammar: Outside Actor X perceives the IO as legitimate.

Keywords: others show sustained interest, achieving goals of other IOs, good working relations, supporting IOs, has been acknowledged by, credible actor for, was authorized as, was entrusted to, is reputed to, called upon

Examples:

- ‘At present, the Organization has 60 permanent observers, which demonstrates a confidence and an interest that we are grateful for.’²⁹
- ‘Because of our focus and tangible results, COMESA is gaining support from the international community.’³⁰

Construction of dependent variable


Normative diversity (main variable). We construct the dependent variable in the following way. First, we code for every IO-year whether a given normative standard is present, that is, whether an IO uses a normative standard in a given year at least once (more than one occurrence of a standard count also as present). Second, we count the number of normative standards per IO-year. This score ranges between 0 and 13. The statistical models presented in the paper use a 3-year rolling of the raw score to account for inter-coder bias and short-term fluctuations in the data.

Normative diversity 2 (robustness). We also construct an alternative version that uses only four broad categories of normative justifications: liberal (democracy, human rights, rule of law, and environmental protection), communitarian (national sovereignty, political community, and economic community), functional (economic welfare, peace and security, international influence, and functional capability), and other (external recognition, structural necessity). We use the same calculations as for the main variable.

²⁹ Organization of American States (2006), p. 16.

³⁰ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (1998), p. 5.

Distribution of dependent variable



A2.2 Independent variables

Agents-based perspective

Institutional heterogeneity (main variable). We combine data on IO country membership provided by the Correlates of Wars (COW) database with VDEM country-level scores on the level of *liberal* democracy institutionalized in the respective country.³¹ We compute the standard deviation of the liberal democracy index across all IO members using these data. As the COW dataset on IO membership does not cover the years between 2015 and 2019, we have coded this membership data manually.

Cultural heterogeneity (main variable). We combine data on IO country membership provided by the Correlates of Wars (COW) database with information on members' type of civilization. A state is categorized as one of nine civilizations according to the largest share of its population (Western, Latin American, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Islamic, African, Sinic, Buddhist, or lone culture).³² Using these data, we compute Rae's fragmentation index, which was developed to estimate how a parliament is fragmented into political parties.³³ The index ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1, indicating higher diversity.

Number of members (robustness check). We operationalize the number of IO members with the help of the Correlates of War (COW) International Organizations dataset, which provides annual membership information for most IOs in our sample.³⁴ For 2015-2019, we added missing membership information by counting the number of members listed on IO websites.

Audience-based perspective

Non-state consultative status (main variable). To proxy the diversity of internal audiences that an IO addresses, we use an updated version of the *Measure of International Authority* dataset to capture those non-governmental actors that have a formal consultative status within the IO across five actor categories: (1) business, (2) labor, (3) parliamentarians, (4) sub-national actors (such as representatives from regional jurisdictions), and (5) other, a category that includes civil

³¹ Pernstein et al. (2020).

³² Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, 'Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism déjà vu? Some evidence', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37: 5, 2000, pp. 583–608.

³³ Douglas W. Rae, *Political consequences of electoral laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

³⁴ Jon C. W. Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, Roseanne W McManus, and Anne Spencer Jamison, 'Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets', *Journal of Peace Research*, 57: 3, 2020, pp. 492–503.

society actors not captured in any of the other categories (academic institutions, NGOs, etc.). Our coding does not use the MIA scores per se but examines the IO profiles that accompany the dataset because the dataset categories are too coarse for our purpose, and the body names do not necessarily reflect a body's composition.³⁵ The variable gives the count of actor categories that have access to the IO via consultative bodies. It ranges from 0 to 5.

Number of CSOs (robustness). We use data provided by the Yearbook of International Organizations to count the number of international civil society organizations (CSOs) present in IO member states. Specifically, we use the count of CSOs present in each IO member state per year and sum it to get the overall number of CSOs present in all member states.³⁶ We logarithmize the resulting number. As the Yearbook only provides this information for the period between 1990 and 2019, the variable does not cover the 1980s.

Donor heterogeneity (main variable). We operationalize the normative heterogeneity of donor states as follows. First, we use the AidData Core Research Release, Version 3.1, to identify all state donors that provided financial support to an IO's member states in a given year.³⁷ We combine this information with the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) country-level scores on the level of liberal democracy institutionalized in these countries and calculate the respective standard deviation across all donors.³⁸ As the AidData dataset only provides data until 2013, this variable does not cover 2014 to 2019.

Number of donors (robustness). We use the AidData Core Research Release, Version 3.1, to identify all state donors that provided financial support to an IO's member states each year, count the number of these donors, and logarithmize the count. As the AidData dataset only provides data until 2013, this variable does not capture 2014 to 2019.

³⁵ Liesbet Hooghe et al., *Measuring International Authority. A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). The data were updated for 2011-2019 by Yoram Haftel and Tobias Lenz 'Measuring institutional overlap in global governance', *The Review of International Organizations*, 17: 1, 2022, pp. 323–47.

³⁶ For a similar approach, see Pamela Paxton, 'Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship', *American Sociological Review*, 67: 2, 2002, pp. 254–77.

³⁷ Michael J. Tierney et al., 'More dollars than sense: Refining our knowledge of development finance using AidData', *World Development*, 39: 11, 2011, pp. 1891–906.

³⁸ Daniel Pernstein et al., 'The V-Dem measurement model: Latent variable analysis for cross-national and cross-temporal expert-coded data', *V-Dem Working Paper 21*, University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2020.

Protest (main variable). We operationalize the politicization of IOs with the help of data generated by keyword searches for the IO name or acronym and the terms ‘protestor’ or ‘demonstrator’ in the Major World Newspapers corpus of the online newspaper database LexisNexis.³⁹ We use the logarithmized count of hits per IO-year to measure politicization.

Peers-based perspective

Policy overlap (main variable). We use data provided by Haftel and Lenz to measure the policy overlap of IOs in our sample with all other IOs in the MIA sample.⁴⁰ This measure gives the average overlap of policy areas a given IO has with all other IOs in the MIA sample.

Count of policy overlap (robustness). We use data provided by Haftel and Lenz to measure the policy overlap of IOs in our sample with all other IOs in the MIA sample.⁴¹ This measure gives the count of IOs from the MIA sample with which a given IO overlaps because the organizations are active in one or more common policy areas.

Membership overlap (main variable). We use data provided by Haftel and Lenz to measure the membership overlap of IOs in our sample with all other IOs in the MIA sample. This measure gives the average membership overlap a given IO has with all other IOs in the MIA sample.

Count of membership overlap (robustness). We use data provided by Haftel and Lenz to measure the membership overlap of IOs in our sample with all other IOs in the MIA sample. This measure gives the count of IOs with which a given IO overlaps because the organizations share one or more member states.

Controls

Type of documents. This is an indicator variable, showing whether our coding per IO-year builds on both types of documents (1), exclusively on Annual Reports (2), or exclusively on Communiqués of Heads of State and Government (3).

³⁹ See also Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks, *A theory of international organization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jönsson, *The opening up of international organizations: Transnational access in global governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁴⁰ Haftel and Lenz (2022).

⁴¹ Haftel and Lenz (2022).

Legitimation intensity. This variable counts the number of all legitimation statements identified (see A2.1 for details on the coding procedure) divided by the count of all coded paragraphs per IO-year.

Year. This variable accounts for temporal trends, using the years in our sample.

IO purpose. We use data provided by the *Measure of International Authority* (MIA) dataset, distinguishing *task-specific* IOs operating on a relatively complete contract that specifies a narrow range of commitments and *general-purpose* organizations that rely on a highly incomplete contract that entails diffuse obligations.⁴²


A.2.2: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Normative diversity	854	0.000	11.000	5.152	2.491
Non-state consultative status	974	0	5	1.202	1.439
Donor heterogeneity	820	0.000	0.436	0.048	0.062
Protest	973	0.000	8.933	1.030	1.558
Institutional heterogeneity	930	0.028	0.320	0.149	0.075
Cultural heterogeneity	961	0.000	0.670	0.243	0.245
Policy overlap	849	0.056	0.437	0.320	0.084
Membership overlap	849	0.027	0.266	0.089	0.064
Document type	903	1.000	3.000	1.641	0.862
Legitimation intensity	903	0.000	1.471	0.416	0.275
Year	974	1,980	2,019	2,001.396	11.032
IO purpose	969	1.000	2.000	1.830	0.376

⁴² Hooghe et al. (2017); Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks, ‘Patterns of international organization: General purpose vs. task specific’, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 49, 2015, pp. 131–56.

A3 Diagnostics

A3.1 Correlation matrix



A3.2 Multicollinearity

Parameter	VIF	Increased SE	Tolerance
Non-state consultative status	1.45	1.20	0.69
Donor heterogeneity	1.02	1.01	0.98
Protest	1.64	1.28	0.61
Institutional heterogeneity	1.23	1.11	0.81
Cultural heterogeneity	1.37	1.17	0.73
Policy overlap	3.38	1.84	0.30
Membership overlap	1.41	1.19	0.71
Document type	1.12	1.06	0.89
Legitimation intensity	1.10	1.05	0.91
Year	3.04	1.74	0.33
IO purpose	1.55	1.24	0.65

Notes: Variables as in Model 4 presented in the main paper

A4 Main model and robustness checks

We estimate alternative models to probe the robustness of our results. First, we use two different versions of our dependent variable. The first alternative uses the raw count of normative standards without superimposing the rolling mean (Table A4.1). The results show that our data are sensitive to annual changes and that our analytical perspectives capture broader tendencies rather than allowing us to point-predict normative diversity. Nonetheless, our key findings for the agent- and peer-based perspectives are robust to this specification. The second alternative uses a coarser measure of normative diversity, distinguishing four broad normative themes (liberal, functional, communitarian, and other; Table A4.2). The results are similar to the main model, except that membership overlap is no longer significant in the full model. This result demonstrates that our findings are not driven by the specifics of our list of normative standards.

Second, we estimate the models with alternative operationalizations of audience heterogeneity (H1a), using the logarithmized count of civil society organizations active in IO member states as a broader measure of the heterogeneity of civil society demands and the logarithmized count of bilateral donors as a more straightforward measure of donor heterogeneity. The first alternative measure does not have a statistically significant effect, underlining our finding that direct access to the IOs is necessary for audiences to shape the normative diversity of an IO's discursive legitimation (Table A4.3). The results for the second alternative operationalization are almost identical to the original results (Table A4.4).

Third, we use an alternative measure for the normative heterogeneity among member states (H2). We estimate the model using the count of member states as a more straightforward measure of heterogeneity among members (Table A4.5). The results are similar, except that membership overlap is no longer significant in the full model.

Finally, we replicate the analysis using alternative operationalizations of the peer-based perspective. We estimate the models using the count of IOs with which a given IO shares one or more members (count of member overlap) or one or more policy areas (count of policy overlap) as more straightforward measures of overlap (Table A4.6). The results for both alternative operationalizations are almost identical to the original findings.

Table A4: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation (original model presented in the paper)

	Normative diversity (rolling mean)			
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	Full Model (4)
Non-state consultative status	0.093 ^{***} (0.035)			0.072 ^{**} (0.034)
Donor heterogeneity	0.005 (0.020)			0.015 (0.021)
Protest	0.069 ^{**} (0.029)			0.036 (0.031)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.122 ^{***} (0.045)		0.126 ^{***} (0.042)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.002 (0.061)		0.004 (0.054)
Policy overlap			0.248 ^{***} (0.053)	0.216 ^{***} (0.055)
Membership overlap			0.188 ^{***} (0.057)	0.111 ^{**} (0.055)
Only Annual report	-0.213 ^{***} (0.035)	-0.221 ^{***} (0.033)	-0.215 ^{***} (0.034)	-0.195 ^{***} (0.035)
Only Communiqué	-0.283 ^{***} (0.032)	-0.297 ^{***} (0.031)	-0.284 ^{***} (0.031)	-0.283 ^{***} (0.032)
Legitimation intensity	0.412 ^{***} (0.022)	0.426 ^{***} (0.021)	0.404 ^{***} (0.022)	0.403 ^{***} (0.023)
Year	0.123 ^{***} (0.026)	0.141 ^{***} (0.020)	0.054 (0.034)	0.011 (0.037)
General purpose	0.253 ^{***} (0.098)	0.289 ^{***} (0.089)	0.101 (0.097)	0.152 [*] (0.081)
Constant	0.105 ^{***} (0.038)	0.113 ^{***} (0.035)	0.091 ^{***} (0.034)	0.103 ^{***} (0.027)
Observations	710	782	740	675
AIC	-37.976	15.944	-47.100	-28.016
BIC	12.242	62.562	-1.033	39.705

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This model uses the raw count of normative standards without superimposing the rolling mean.

Table A4.1: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity			
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	Full Model (4)
Non-state consultative status	0.024 (0.032)			0.015 (0.030)
Donor heterogeneity	0.013 (0.019)			0.025 (0.020)
Protest	0.039 (0.028)			0.013 (0.030)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.095*** (0.035)		0.089*** (0.034)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.044 (0.039)		0.057 (0.040)
Policy overlap			0.127*** (0.047)	0.125*** (0.047)
Membership overlap			0.089** (0.041)	0.032 (0.040)
Only Annual Report	-0.330*** (0.034)	-0.342*** (0.031)	-0.314*** (0.033)	-0.312*** (0.033)
Only Communiqué	-0.331*** (0.029)	-0.331*** (0.027)	-0.327*** (0.029)	-0.314*** (0.029)
Legitimation intensity	0.584*** (0.021)	0.591*** (0.020)	0.579*** (0.021)	0.576*** (0.022)
Year	0.083*** (0.024)	0.076*** (0.018)	0.047 (0.031)	0.014 (0.034)
General purpose	0.265*** (0.060)	0.284*** (0.050)	0.183*** (0.067)	0.213*** (0.060)
Constant	0.161*** (0.026)	0.167*** (0.021)	0.155*** (0.024)	0.155*** (0.020)
<i>Observations</i>	755	852	784	718
<i>AIC</i>	-12.295	22.925	-6.114	0.903
<i>BIC</i>	38.599	70.401	40.530	69.550

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This model uses a coarser measure of normative diversity, distinguishing four broad normative themes (liberal, functional, communitarian, and other)

Table A4.2: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity 2 (rolling mean)			
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	Full Model (4)
Non-state consultative status	0.072* (0.040)			0.069* (0.038)
Donor heterogeneity	0.028 (0.022)			0.037 (0.024)
Protest	0.045 (0.033)			0.029 (0.035)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.178*** (0.047)		0.160*** (0.046)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.009 (0.060)		0.023 (0.059)
Policy overlap			0.126** (0.061)	0.133** (0.061)
Membership overlap			0.148** (0.063)	0.058 (0.059)
Only Annual Report	-0.184*** (0.040)	-0.190*** (0.035)	-0.197*** (0.038)	-0.171*** (0.039)
Only Communiqué	-0.286*** (0.036)	-0.300*** (0.033)	-0.295*** (0.036)	-0.298*** (0.036)
Legitimation intensity	0.360*** (0.026)	0.318*** (0.023)	0.338*** (0.025)	0.335*** (0.026)
Year	0.100*** (0.029)	0.086*** (0.021)	0.081** (0.038)	-0.002 (0.041)
General purpose	0.239** (0.102)	0.279*** (0.086)	0.176 (0.107)	0.207** (0.088)
Constant	0.116*** (0.040)	0.135*** (0.034)	0.112*** (0.037)	0.124*** (0.029)
<i>Observations</i>	710	782	740	675
<i>AIC</i>	148.768	127.465	156.183	114.828
<i>BIC</i>	198.986	174.084	202.249	182.549

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This model uses an alternative measure of civil society demand (count of CSOs).

Table 4.3: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity			Full Model (4)
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	
Count of CSOs (log)	0.141* (0.073)			0.023 (0.119)
Donor heterogeneity	0.012 (0.023)			0.021 (0.026)
Protest	0.017 (0.033)			-0.001 (0.034)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.122*** (0.045)		0.114** (0.051)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.002 (0.061)		0.003 (0.063)
Policy overlap			0.248*** (0.053)	0.235*** (0.062)
Membership overlap			0.188*** (0.057)	0.162 (0.114)
Only Annual Report	-0.161*** (0.038)	-0.221*** (0.033)	-0.215*** (0.034)	-0.144*** (0.039)
Only Communiqué	-0.262*** (0.038)	-0.297*** (0.031)	-0.284*** (0.031)	-0.275*** (0.038)
Legitimation intensity	0.368*** (0.025)	0.426*** (0.021)	0.404*** (0.022)	0.359*** (0.026)
Year	0.002 (0.045)	0.141*** (0.020)	0.054 (0.034)	-0.098 (0.069)
General purpose	0.317*** (0.108)	0.289*** (0.089)	0.101 (0.097)	0.162* (0.095)
Constant	0.128*** (0.042)	0.113*** (0.035)	0.091*** (0.034)	0.122*** (0.032)
<i>Observations</i>	543	782	740	519
<i>AIC</i>	-38.632	15.944	-47.100	-33.664
<i>BIC</i>	8.636	62.562	-1.033	30.115

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This model uses an alternative measure of donor heterogeneity (count of donors).

Table 4.4: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity			
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	Full Model (4)
Non-state consultative status	0.091*** (0.035)			0.071** (0.034)
Count of donors (log)	0.035 (0.040)			0.012 (0.040)
Protest	0.075*** (0.029)			0.039 (0.031)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.122*** (0.045)		0.122*** (0.043)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.002 (0.061)		-0.008 (0.056)
Policy overlap			0.248*** (0.053)	0.210*** (0.056)
Membership overlap			0.188*** (0.057)	0.126** (0.057)
Only Annual Report	-0.210*** (0.035)	-0.221*** (0.033)	-0.215*** (0.034)	-0.194*** (0.035)
Only Communiqué	-0.282*** (0.032)	-0.297*** (0.031)	-0.284*** (0.031)	-0.281*** (0.032)
Legitimation intensity	0.407*** (0.022)	0.426*** (0.021)	0.404*** (0.022)	0.398*** (0.023)
Year	0.126*** (0.026)	0.141*** (0.020)	0.054 (0.034)	0.018 (0.038)
General purpose	0.243** (0.099)	0.289*** (0.089)	0.101 (0.097)	0.155* (0.082)
Constant	0.104*** (0.038)	0.113*** (0.035)	0.091*** (0.034)	0.102*** (0.027)
<i>Observations</i>	718	782	740	682
<i>AIC</i>	-41.547	15.944	-47.100	-31.501
<i>BIC</i>	8.794	62.562	-1.033	36.374

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This model uses an alternative measure for states' normative heterogeneity (count of members).

Table 4.5: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity			
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	Full Model (4)
Non-state consultative status	0.093*** (0.035)			0.080** (0.036)
Donor heterogeneity	0.005 (0.020)			0.008 (0.020)
Protest	0.069** (0.029)			0.029 (0.031)
Count of member states		0.228*** (0.064)		0.171* (0.104)
Cultural heterogeneity		-0.112 (0.071)		-0.077 (0.069)
Policy overlap			0.248*** (0.053)	0.197*** (0.057)
Membership overlap			0.188*** (0.057)	0.012 (0.103)
Only Annual Report	-0.213*** (0.035)	-0.225*** (0.032)	-0.215*** (0.034)	-0.204*** (0.035)
Only Communiqué	-0.283*** (0.032)	-0.292*** (0.030)	-0.284*** (0.031)	-0.279*** (0.032)
Legitimation intensity	0.412*** (0.022)	0.423*** (0.021)	0.404*** (0.022)	0.403*** (0.023)
Year	0.123*** (0.026)	0.145*** (0.019)	0.054 (0.034)	0.029 (0.038)
General purpose	0.253*** (0.098)	0.293*** (0.095)	0.101 (0.097)	0.130 (0.099)
Constant	0.105*** (0.038)	0.104*** (0.037)	0.091*** (0.034)	0.092*** (0.034)
<i>Observations</i>	710	818	740	707
<i>AIC</i>	-37.976	-13.183	-47.100	-46.606
<i>BIC</i>	12.242	33.886	-1.033	21.809

Notes:

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This model uses an alternative measure of policy and member overlap (count of member overlap and count of policy overlap)

Table 4.6: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity			
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	Full Model (4)
Non-state consultative status	0.093*** (0.035)			0.065** (0.033)
Donor heterogeneity	0.005 (0.020)			0.029 (0.021)
Protest	0.069** (0.029)			0.025 (0.029)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.122*** (0.045)		0.147*** (0.041)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.002 (0.061)		-0.028 (0.054)
Count of policy overlap			0.231*** (0.045)	0.416*** (0.056)
Count of member overlap			0.139** (0.058)	0.142** (0.056)
Only Annual Report	-0.213*** (0.035)	-0.221*** (0.033)	-0.199*** (0.031)	-0.178*** (0.034)
Only Communiqué	-0.283*** (0.032)	-0.297*** (0.031)	-0.260*** (0.029)	-0.269*** (0.031)
Legitimation intensity	0.412*** (0.022)	0.426*** (0.021)	0.416*** (0.020)	0.381*** (0.022)
Year	0.123*** (0.026)	0.141*** (0.020)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.217*** (0.045)
General purpose	0.253*** (0.098)	0.289*** (0.089)	0.142 (0.101)	0.081 (0.081)
Constant	0.105*** (0.038)	0.113*** (0.035)	0.083** (0.036)	0.082*** (0.027)
<i>Observations</i>	710	782	820	675
<i>AIC</i>	-37.976	15.944	-48.110	-78.471
<i>BIC</i>	12.242	62.562	-1.017	-10.750

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

This table replicates the models with the alternative regional diffusion measure for the peers-based perspective.

Table 4.7: Origins of normative diversity in discursive legitimation

	Normative diversity			Full Model (4)
	Audiences (1)	Agents (2)	Peers (3)	
Non-state consultative status	0.093*** (0.035)			0.098*** (0.036)
Donor heterogeneity	0.005 (0.020)			0.011 (0.022)
Protest	0.069** (0.029)			0.060* (0.031)
Institutional heterogeneity		0.122*** (0.045)		0.138*** (0.046)
Cultural heterogeneity		0.002 (0.061)		0.004 (0.061)
Regional diffusion			0.018 (0.023)	0.022 (0.026)
Only Annual Report	-0.213*** (0.035)	-0.221*** (0.033)	-0.214*** (0.032)	-0.201*** (0.036)
Only Communiqué	-0.283*** (0.032)	-0.297*** (0.031)	-0.289*** (0.030)	-0.286*** (0.033)
Legitimation intensity	0.412*** (0.022)	0.426*** (0.021)	0.425*** (0.021)	0.404*** (0.024)
Year	0.123*** (0.026)	0.141*** (0.020)	0.150*** (0.021)	0.086*** (0.031)
General purpose	0.253*** (0.098)	0.289*** (0.089)	0.250** (0.108)	0.300*** (0.083)
Constant	0.105*** (0.038)	0.113*** (0.035)	0.099** (0.042)	0.116*** (0.033)
<i>Observations</i>	710	782	810	663
<i>AIC</i>	-37.976	15.944	-4.437	-10.389
<i>BIC</i>	12.242	62.562	37.836	52.566

Notes:

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Multilevel model using the lme4 R package, Standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.